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Preface

Since the Supreme Court decision in the case of Penn

Central Transportation Co. v. New York City

438 U.S. 104,

,

(1978), transfer of development rights has been utilized as
a

means of preservation.

The problem facing many urban

landmarks is that the economic pressures that control the
beat of a city are usually geared for new construction.
The new construction allows for the highest and best use of
the property.

Older buildings of historic significance

are usually built at a density lower than that determined by
the municipality for the particular site.

As such,

they

are prime targets for demolition and redevelopment.

Transfer of development rights attempts to provide an

economic solution for the burdens of landmark designation.
It

allows for the building to remain in private ownership by

providing the owner with some sort of relief for his
inability to redevelop the site for its highest and best
use.

By allowing the private sector to provide economic

relief for the landmark owner, the municipality is saved

from purchasing the sites it wishes to preserve.
The transfer of development rights involves many

complex questions and issues as to its role in land use
legislation, constitutional law, and historic

preservation.

This paper attempts to outline specific

questions concerning their issues and their use.

The

purpose in writing this paper is to analyze a method of

historic preservation that thrusts what has become, over
time,

a

municipal duty, preserving our architectural

heritage,

back into the realm of the private sector.

The paper starts with a summary of the historic

preservation movement in the United States starting with the
role of small,

site-oriented groups.

such as the restoration/re-

important events are earmarked,

creation

Particularly

of Williamsburg and the preservation ethic that

evolved from it, and the establishment of the National
Trust.

It continues with an analysis of the legal issues

of property,

Early cases such

land use, and preservation.

as Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon

260 U.S. 393 (1922); Village

,

of Euclid V. Ambler Realty Co.

272 U.S. 365 (1926); and

,

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City are
cited.

Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Nollan V.

California Coastal Commission

,

107 S. Ct. 3141

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
Ct.

1232 (1987);

are utilized.

and

(1987);
,

107 S.

The issue of transfer of

development rights as compensation is addressed, again
citing the Penn Central case, but also utilizing the Fred
French Investment Co. v. City of New York

,

385 N.Y.S.2nd

F.
5

(1976) case and the recent Supreme Court decision in First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale y. County of
Los Angeles

,

107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).

The transfer of

development rights is explained, followed by an analysis of
John J. Costonis's Chicago Plan.

The program in New York

City is analyzed, reviewing three uses of the transfer of

development rights.

The economics of transfer of

development rights is explored.

The three types of

transfer of development rights systems are explained.
Issues involved in the transfer of rights are explored and

recommendations for
changes in the New York program are outlined.

The above mentioned issues are addressed by an analysis
of relevant writings regarding each particular issue.

Contrasting opinions are presented and conclusions
pertaining to the validity of each arguement are presented.

An examination of how these issues fit into both the Chicago
Plan and the New York City program is presented.

I

.

The Beginnings of Preservation
A. The Early Years

Journals, diaries, paintings, sculpture, architecture:
all of these things are records of man's achievements, his

hopes, his dreams, and sometimes his failures.

They all

aid in our understanding of who we are as a nation and as a

culture.

They are all similar, save one: architecture.

Architecture is around us every day.

It

does not have to

We move freely in

be sought out or confined to a vault.

and around, enter and exit from buildings every day, more

than likely with very little thought about the important
role buildings play in our lives.

Our built environment is

taken for granted.
We have certainly come to a consensus that for many,

architecture is taken for granted.
as a blanket statement.

Sadly this can be taken

Buildings of architectural and

cultural significance for the United States have been
ignored for many years.

All but the most sacred have been

threatened with either significant alteration or demolition.
It

is believed that up to one third of the buildings on the

Historic American Buildings Survey are now demolished. (1)
The trend in American has been to change, to demolish;

demolition was seen as a sign of progress.

everyone felt this way.

Happily not

Historic preservationists in the

United States have been fighting for almost 150 years to
raise the conscience of a nation.

It

has been our goal to

save those few remnants of our past.

Preservation in the

United States started roughly and meekly as

a

band of women

gathered together to save the home of George Washington.

Today it is a multi-million dollar business (2) which
employs hundreds of men and women in every state in diverse
fields such as law, accounting, construction and academia.
The genesis of preservation is at once humble and
noble.

The goal was to preserve Mount Vernon, the Virginia

home of George Washington.

Guided by the determination of

Ann Pamela Cunningham, the Mount Vernon Ladies Association
was able to secure the title to the property before the

outbreak of the Civil War.

(3)

This early venture was the start of the preservation

movement in the United States.

From this we have the

growth of groups such as the Society for the Preservation of

New England Antiquities and the Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Foundation.

The Thomas Jefferson group ultimately achieved

its objective to acquire title to Monticello.

(4)

Groups

such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the

National Society of the Colonial Dames of the American
Revolution emulated the activities of the Mount Vernon
Ladies' Association.

By the second decade of the twentieth

century, both groups were active vocal advocates of the

preservation of our architectural and historic heritage,
aiding groups in their task to preserve structures

throughout the United States.

(5)

B.

Williamsburg

The 1930s and 1940s were dominated by the legacy of

Williamsburg, Virginia.

The Williamsburg

restoration/recreation can be considered a revolution for
At no time before had any

the preservation movement.

preservation or restoration project influenced both the

preservation community and common citizens.

Williamsburg

was to shape the future of preservation even to this decade.

Briefly, Williamsburg was the fusion of two important

vision and a bottomless source of

elements:

a clear

funding.

Williamsburg was well endowed on both accounts.

The recreation of United States history, the attempt to
bring to life the spirit of the past,

(6) was the brainchild

of Dr. William Archer Rutherford Goodwin.

(7)

By 1923, it

is believed that Goodwin had fully formulated his dream of

representing the entire lower peninsula of Virginia as the
birth place of the United States, with Williamsburg,

restored and rebuilt to reflect its eighteenth century
grandeur,

as its spirited center.

(8)

By 1926, John

Rockefeller had become the backer for Goodwin's plans.

D.
(9)

By the fall of 1927, the colonial restoration of

Williamsburg had been widely reported in the newspaper and
magazines.

Clearly, the

"

idea of carrying a whole city

back to its eighteenth century appearance caught the

imagination of the nation." (10)

C

.

Preservation in the 1960s

The Williamsburg philosophy was one of the most
Its effects

persistent preservation ethics of our time.
reach into this decade.

By the 1960s, the idea of

preservation had become fairly widespread.
of Pennsylvania Station,

McKim, Mead,

The destruction

and White's 1913

masterpiece of the Beaux Arts, in 1961-2 was the last
straw.

Such a significant loss combined with the populism

generated by Williamsburg, manifested itself in a federal
presence in the preservation field.

The 1960s gave us the

National Historic Preservation Act in October of 1966, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and entering the
1970s, Executive Order 11593 of 1971.

"What was once

termed the "Decade of Decision" (12) had become the "Decade
of Progress"

(13)

Preservation had become national policy,

an indication of its pervasiveness.

But preservation had

also become a planning process that would determine how our
towns, cities and countryside would look.

(14)

The change in preservation from a discipline that

insulated buildings from the realities of the world to one
that integrated the old with the new was a major step.

No

longer would the museum be the final destination for the

preserved building.

Our architectural heritage could be

preserved while it still contributed to our world.

Ideas

such as adaptive use brought new uses into old buildings,

going so far as to alter the way americans perceive what is

acceptable as

a

home.

rock music in churches,

We now live in factories,

dance to

view art in railroad stations.

Along with new planning, one finds new sources of profits.
While the Sixties may have been the decade of progress, the

Seventies were the decade of the dollar.

D.

Preservation in the 1970s

Preservation was an economic venture, promoted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.

The Act fostered preservation by

the disallowal of deductions for the demolition of a

building; allowing accelerated depreciation of renovations

approved by the Secretary of the Interior,

and permitting

five year amortization of certain owner-incurred expenses.
(15)

The Tax Reform Act was amended in 1980.

The concept

of economic incentive was ushered into our decade.

As can be seen by the above genealogy, what started as
a move to

"museumize

'

some of our nation's historic

structures has become much less specific and static.

Preservation of buildings in the last quarter of the
twentieth century effectively stems from two diverse
sources: urban planning and economics.

The issues inherent

in these two disciplines are now issues for preservation:

economic return, tax incentives, neighbourhood preservation,
urban renewal, open space, density.

Economics and urban

planning combine to act as a form of preservation.

The

transfer of development rights, usually a tool for the land
planner,

is the key.

Its dependence upon planning and

economics allows for the continual presence of many historic
buildings in one congested urban landscape.

II

.

Legal Aspects of Property, Preservation and the

Transfer of Development Rights
A.

The importance of property

Christopher Duerksen stated that there "are over 1,000
local preservation ordinances; every state has at least some

preservation related laws; and there are more than a dozen
federal statutes and literally hundreds of pages in the Code
of Federal Regulations pertaining to preservation programs."
(16) A program such as one that deals with the transfer of a

historic landmark's unused development must comply with a
statutes and court decisions involving the legal use of

property and, by extension, landmark designation.
The basis of property law in the United States can be

traced through its links with English Common Law to the

Magna Carta.

John

I.

barons.

The Magna Carta was signed in 1215 by King

It guaranteed certain fundamental rights to his

One of those rights was the right

to protect

property and prevent its unlawful seizure by the government
(i.e.

the king) without some sort of payment for the loss to

the owner.

10

;

B.

The U.S.

Constitution

Early colonial law was for the most part heard in

English courts so the English tradition of the sacred role
of property was slowly embodied in the awakening American

consciousness. After the colonies had won their

independence, the men who fought so hard for freedom set
about creating a government of laws, clearly defined yet

flexible enough to grow and change with its citizenry.
These men drew from the only source they truly knew--English

common law.

The protection of one's property was

established in the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution
"[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law, nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

(17)

The first half of the amendment provides for the protection

from unlawful seizure of property.

Property can not be

taken without some sort of judicial procedure to ensure the

validity and legality of the claim.

provides for fair compensation.

The second half

This right of property is

protected against arbitrary state action in the Fourteenth
Amendment, section

1:

"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

11

United States: nor shall any State deprive any person
liberty, or property, without due process of

of life,

law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws." (18)

Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States and
the lower federal and state courts have upheld the rights of

private property.

The Supreme Court's role as an

interpreter of the Constitution has allowed for a less
specific definition of the phrase "life, liberty, or
The Court has decided over the years what

property." (19)

constitutes control of one's property.

C.

Zoning

The decisions made by the Court that control or limit
the use of property by an individual have been for our

purposes in the realms of zoning, land control and

preservation.

The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was

enacted in the City of New York in 1916 in response to the

completion of the Equitable Building in Wall Street.

The

building rose over twenty stories, covering its entire lot.
The shadows produced by the building, some casting entire
streets in a mid-day darkness, alarmed people so much that
the City passed a zoning resolution which called for

setbacks in a building's facade at prescribed heights.

This zoning resolution produced the wonderful jazz-age

12

The single

buildings that for which New York is famous.

most important decision on the question of zoning is

embodied in the case, Village of Euclid
Company

.

(20)

v.

Ambler Realty

This was the Supreme Court's first decision

on the constitutionality of zoning legislation and

restrictions.

D.

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.

The Supreme Court first considered the constitu-

tionality of zoning restrictions in this case.

At issue

was whether or not the village of Euclid's zoning ordinance
could prohibit the Ambler Realty Company from using property
for commercial purposes which the village had zoned for

residential use.

(21)

Ambler Realty believed that such a

restirction was an overextension of the state's police
powers.

The Court upheld the ordinance.

It found that

the restrictions related to the general welfare of its

citizens and therefore upheld the ordinance as a valid use
of police powers.

(22)

The Court stated that by excluding

commercial buildings from a residential area, the
legislature promoted the health of children, incrased fire
safety,

and facilitated the enforcement of traffic and

The Court noted that although

general welfare regulations.

the general public interest may at times outweigh a

municipality's interest in promoting police power objectives
through zoning regulation, this concern was compelling in

13

.

Euclid.

(23)

Preservation and the Law:

E.

Historic preservation may seem to have been accepted by
but it has been challenged in the courts.

the public,

Seen

as an overextension of government's powers by many

developers, cases have been brought before the Supreme Court
The Court has heard cases which deal

of the United States.

with the preservation of site and of buildings.

These

sites and buildings span in importance from the national to

Three cases seem to have best defined historic

the local.

These cases are United States v. Gettysburg

landmarking.

Electric Railway Company
V.

Parker

.

,

160 U.S. 668 (1896),

348 U.S. 26 (1954),

Transportation Company

1

.

v.

(25);

(24);

Berman

and Penn Central

New York City

(

26

)

United States v. Gettysburg Electric

Railway Co.

The first case, United States v. Gettysburg

,

esta-

blished the precedent that condemnation by the government
could be used for preservation purposes,

important historic sites.

(40)

specifically at

The Court wrote:

The battle of Gettysburg was one of the greatest

battles of the world... such a use seems necessarily not

14

'

only

a

public use, but one so closely connected with the

welfare of the republic itself as to be within the the
powers granted Congress by the Constitution for the

purpose of protecting and preserving the whole
country.

"

(28)

This case extended the powers of the United States
governinent to condemn for preservation purposes.

Historic

sites before this time were saved only by the intervention
of private groups such as the Mount Vernon Ladies

Association.

Following this case, the government began a

program of acquiring sites, mostly natural sites, to begin
the National Parks Service.

2

.

Berman v. Parker

The second case is Berman v. Parker

.

The Supreme

Court's decision, although the case actually involved

condemnation under urban renewal statutes, strongly
supported land use controls based upon aesthetic
considerations.

(29)

The decision was unanimous.

The

opinion stated:
It is within the power of the legislative to

determine that the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy,

spacious as well as clean, well balanced as

well as carefully patrolled." (30)

15

Berman

Parker influenced many local governments to enact

v.

preservation ordinances in the 1960s.

(31)

Before this

zoning and land use controls were geared towards the

time,

preservation of open space, light, and air.

The idea of a

pleasant built environment had never been considered, due to
the subjective nature of the terms aesthetic and beautiful.

This case supports design control regulations.

3

.

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York

City

The third case, P enn Central Transportation Company v.

New York City, amplified the Court's ruling in Berman v.
Parker

The Court wrote:

.

[T]his Court has recognized, in a number of
settings, that the States and cities may enact land use

restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life
by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic

features of a city." (32)

The Court cited Berman as precedent.

This case also

involves such legal dilemmas found in preservation such as
the issues of the unlawful taking of property and just

compensation.

The Court settled the taking issue with the

following:
"It is,

of course,

true that the landmarks law has

more severe impact on some landowners than on others.

16

but that in itself does not mean that the law effects a
"taking'.

Legislation designed to promote the general

welfare commonly burdens some more than others." (33)
In terms of compensation,

the Court found that the

Terminal's unused development right may not have provided a
suitable return had a taking occurred.

afforded were valuable.

However, the rights

The rights lessened whatever

financial burdens the designation had imposed on the

Terminal and were taken into account in considering the
impact of the regulation.

(34)

17

Ill

.

The Taking Issue
A.

The Constitution and Taking

The issue of "taking" property is grounded in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,

The

but how has it been interpreted by the Supreme Court?

idea of landmarking and preservation and taking of property
For every taking there must be

has debated in the Courts.
compensation.

The sale and transfer of the development

rights is one solution.

An examination of the legal

concept of taking, as defined by the Court, must start with

Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon

.

Two recent

(35)

decisions by the Court are then examined: Keystone

Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus
V.

California Coastal Commission.

(37)

{

36

)

and Nollan

These two cases

further the definition of what exactly is a taking.

The

taking of property calls for the payment of compensation to
the owner. Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the Court's

stance on compensation.

The Penn Central decision allows

for the transfer of development rights to serve as a means
of offsetting the financial burden caused by designation.

In the Fred F. French Investment Co. v.
(38) case,

City of New York

the New York State Court of Appeals found that

when a taking has occurred, the transfer of development
rights does not offset the impact of the legislation and the
The Court's recent First

legitimacy of the objective.

English Evangelical Luthern Church of Glendale v. County of

18

Los Angeles (39) determines what is adequate compensation

when a legislative taking had occurred.
A taking of property occurs when the court finds that

regulation is overly burdensome in its restriction of use

without proper compensation in violation of the fifth and
Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.

(40)

The

starting point of any analysis of the Taking issue is the

decision by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Company
v

.

Mahon decided in 1922.

When a landowner contends that

the Fifth Amendment has been violated due to legislative
action,

landmarking for example, one or more of the

following restrictions can apply.

First an owner's future

development options can be limited; second, development can
be made less financially attractive,

lowering the value of

the site.; third, designation can restrict the owner's

vested rights; and fourthly, the owner can have a duty

placed upon him that requires him to maintain a structure in
a

particular fashion and ultimately cost.

19

(41)

B.

The Classical Definition of a Taking

The Pennsylvania Coal Company was a mining company

which operated in the state of Pennsylvania.

The coal

company had purchased large tracts of land to insure future

availability of areas in which to mine.

To reduce the cost

acquisition, the Coal Company sold the surface rights to

Mahon's predecessor in title in 1878.

The Company reserved

the right to remove all the coal underneath the site.

The

contract that existed between the Company and the owners

stipulated that at some time in the future subsidence of the
surface would occur due to the mining operations.

The

Mahons wished to "prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from

mining under their property in such a way as to remove the
supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their
home." (42)

The Mahons claimed that the Kohler Act passed

by the State of Pennsylvania on May 27, 1921 had taken away

the Coal Company's rights to mine below their home and the

Company's freedom from damage claims.

(43)

The Kohler Act was an attempt by the State to protect
the homes of its residents in areas of mining activity.

The act forbade the mining of coal in an area that was used
as a residence or mining within 150 feet of an improved

property.

(44)

The statute superseded existing rights.

The Pennsylvania Coal Company claimed that the State had,

through the Kohler act, illegally taken their property.
The question for Chief Justice Holmes was whether or

20

not the Kohler Act was an overextension of the State's

police powers.

First, he needed to determine what

(45)

Second, how

was the property interest of the Coal Company.
wide was the threat claimed by the Mahons.

Justice Holmes

identified the property interest involved as the right to
The Kohler Act destroyed that property interest

mine coal.

by making it impracticable to mine.

He wrote,

"

What makes

the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised

with profit.

To make it commercially impracticable to mine

certain coal has very nearly the same effect for

constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.
This we think we are warranted in assuming that the statute
does.

"

(46)

Justice Holmes determined that the threat to the

general public was non-existent in this case and the Kohler
Act was an over compensation for an action that affected one
family.

The property interest of the Company was

destroyed; it was not a partial diminution in value.

Holmes further stated that he found the State as well as the
Mahons short-sited to buy only a partial interest in their
property.

He wrote,

"the question at bottom is

the loss of the changes desired should fall.

upon whom

So far as

private persons or communities have seen fit to take the
risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that
the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the

giving to them greater rights than they bought." (47)

Holmes concluded,

"We are in danger of forgetting that a

21

strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut then
the constitutional way of paying for the change."

C.

(48)

The Taking Issue in the 1970s: A New Criterion

Pennsylvania Coal Co.

Mahon set the standard for the

v.

next fifty years of Supreme Court decisions.

government action were firmly stated.

The limits of

In the realm of

preservation, this limit was realized.

When legal process

began for Penn Central, surely the New York preservationists

knew that the legal future of historic preservation hung in
the balance.

opinion,

In 1978, when the Supreme Court delivered its

it heralded in a new definition of taking that has

made historic preservation, and ultimately the transfer of

development rights, a viable feature in american life.
Judge Brennan identified four distinct steps necessary
to determine if a taking had occurred.

First,

is the

interest at issue sufficiently bound up with a reasonable

expectation of the claimant to constitute property for Fifth
Amendment purposes.

Next,

must be identified.

Third,

legislative action.

the property interest involved

analyze the character of the

Finally,

the nature and the extent of

the interference must be examined.
the following conclusions.

Judge Brennan reached

The air rights of the Terminal

were property for Fifth Amendment purposes.

Penn Central

had a full fee interest in the site, not just in one

22

"

The landmark law was part of a comprehensive

segment.
plan.

The legislative action did not interfere with Grand

Central's action as a train station.

It is these several

aspects of the case that ultimately differentiate the Penn

Central case from Pennsylvania Coal.

Brennan first addresses a central issue of taking
jurisprudence that was

a

key argument in Pennysylvania Coal:

the characterization of the property interest that is

Holmes recognizes coal as a

alledged to have been taken.

"valuable estate" (49) and separate from the the surface
estate. He also stated that it was the owner's of the

surface estate obligation to secure all estates, thus

furthering the argument that land is divisible into estates
Brennan's refutation is as follows:

or layers.

(50)

""Taking

jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel

'

into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether

rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.

In deciding whether a particular government

action has affected a taking, this court focuses rather both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.

.
.

(51)

In the Penn Central case,

the air rights were seen as

part of the Terminal's property interest.

Because the were

segments of the property were one and not seperate, action
to one particular segment of the site,

such as the air above

the Terminal, can not be analysed in isolation..
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In

Pennsylvania Coal, the right to mine coal was the property
The Kohler Act, by not allowing for mining to

interest.

occur at a particular site, destroyed that property

He wrote concerning the government's action:

interest

"the

submission that appellants may establish a "taking' simply
by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit
a

property interest that they hereforto had believed was

available for development is quite simple untenable." (52)
The third step of Brennan

'

s

analysis was determining

the character of the government's action.

The Penn Central

Company claimed that the landmarking of its Terminal was an
undue burden,

singling out the company from the rest of the

property owners.

Brennan found "no merit" (53)

in this

He stated that the New York preservation program

claim.

"embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of

historic or aesthetic interest." (54)

It is the presence

of this plan which distinguishes such legislation from

discrimatory spot zoning.

(55)

Brennan continued to analyse the nature of the
designation.
of course,

He introduced the concept of impact:

"It is,

true that the Landmarks Law has a more severe

impact on some landowners than others, but that in itself
does not mean that the law effects a taking.

Legislation

designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens
some more than others."

Penn Central was not uniquely

(56)

burdened; other properties had been designated in New
York.

Brennan concluded: "Unless we are to reject the
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judgement of the New York City Council that the preservation
of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all

structures, both economically and by improving the quality
of life in the city as a whole-which we are unwilling to

do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have
in no sense been benefitted by the Landmarks Law." (57)

Finally, Brennan stated that the Landmarks Law in no

way "impaired the present use of the Terminal." (58)

The

property interest was not taken for a city purpose such as
in Fred F. French.

The effect of the Landmarks Law is to

simply "prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying

portions of the airspace above the Terminal, while

permitting appellants to use the remainder of the parcel in
a gainful fashion."

(59)
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"

D.

"

The Taking Issue in the 1980s

"...65 years later

,

we address a different set of

particular facts involving the Pennsylvania Legislature's
1966 conclusion that the Commonwealth's existing mine

subsidence legislation had failed to protect the public
interest in safety,

land conservation, preservation of

affected municipalities' tax bases and land development in
the commonwealth."

(60)

So started Justice Stevens in his

opinion of the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
V.

DeBenedictis

.

We are again in Pennsylvania and the

issue in question is land subsidence resulting from mining

The Court affirmed two lower court decisions which

coal.

stated that the layers of land at issue in this case,
surface,

support,

and mineral,

cannot be examined as

separate independent layers, but must be viewed as

a

segment

of a larger intertwined "bundle of rights that invariably

includes either the surface estate or the mineral estate.
(61)

Penn Central is cited as precedent.

While the Court

recognized similarities, they also noted that "the
similarities are far less significant than the differences
and that Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case.
(62)

Initially, it appears that Keystone continues the legal

standards established by the Penn Central decision.

indeed it does.

The changes that are to be of key

significance are found in the dissent written by Chief
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And

Justice Rehnquist.

It is true that the dissenting opinion

does not alter judicial policy.

Instead,

one must view it

as a guide to determine the prevailing flow of judicial

thought.

Nollan

V.

California Coastal Commission displays the
The clock

more conservative agenda of the Rehnquist Court.

appears to have been turned back on the constitutional issue
of property and taking.

The case as it appeared before the

U.S. Supreme Court involved an easement across the

beachfront property of James and Marilyn Nollan.

The

property had a small bungalow on it that the Nollans rented
out to summer vacationers.

into disrepair.

The bungalow eventually fell

The Nollans wished to demolish the

bungalow and replace it with a cottage three times as
large.

By demolishing the bungalow, they took up their

long term option on the property and finely obtained

ownership in fee.

They requested a coastal development

permit from the California Coastal Commission.

The

Commission is charged with the protection of the California
coastline and reviews all applications for development along
the coast.

They wished to replace the bungalow with a

three bedroom house in keeping with the character of the

neighbourhood's existing development.

The Commission's

staff recommended "that the permit [to build] be granted

subject to the condition that they allow the public an

easement to pass across a portion of their property." (63)
This would allow for easier access by the public to two
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public beaches.

The Nollans protested such an imposition.

The issue in this case is the question: should the state

have to pay the Nollans for the public use of their land as
a link

The Commission stated that the

between two beaches.

increased bulk of the Nollan's new home "would increase the
blockage of the view of the ocean.

..

contributing to the

development of a ""wall of residential structures' that

would prevent the public from [realizing that there is a
stretch of coastline] that they have every right to visit."

Private use of the shore would increase (65) as well

(64)

as "cumulatively burden the public's ability to traverse to

and along the shorefront.

"

(66)

The fact that some aspect of private property was taken
for public use,

taking.

in the eyes of the Court,

constituted a

The California Coastal Commission would have been

within its limits to attach conditions to its permit if it
furthered the goals of the body.

The condition for the

prohibition must advance some need outlined by the governing
body.

But the Court stated,

"[t]he evident constitutional

propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted
for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end

advanced as the justification for the prohibition." (67)
The Court was able to check legislative land use control.
The Court's evaluation of the situation concludes as
follows:

"The purpose then becomes, quite simply,

the

obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation.
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Whatever may

be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests' in the

takings and land use context, this is not one of them.
short,

unless the permit condition serves the same

governmental purpose as the development ban, the building

restriction is not a valid regulation of land use, but an
out and out plan of extortion.
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"

(68)

In

E.

Compensation: The Payment for Police Powers

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

protects the property rights of its citizens.
is taken,

If property

the Constitution states that compensation must be

paid to the owner of the property.

This protection of

one's rights stems back to the Middle Ages.

The

government's ability to take property and compensate the
owner through eminent domain.

Compensation consists of paying the owner the fair
market value for his land.

This is determined through

appraisal techniques: recent sales of similar sites, damages
to the owner, etc.

The recent Supreme Court decision in

F irst English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

County of Los Angeles

,

held that when a court has determined

that a particular regulation was so restrictive that it

constituted a "taking', the government must pay the property
owner just compensation even if property interest was only
"taken' temporarily.

Stating the opinion of the Court,

Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:

"in this case the California

Court of Appeals held that a landowner who claims that his

property has been "taken' by a land use regulation
constitutes a "taking' of his property.

We disagree, and

conclude that in these circumstances the Fifth and

Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution

would require compensation for that period." (69)

The

Chief Justice went to great lengths to state that there is
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little difference between a permanent taking and one that is

Citing previous government practice,

temporary.

such as

paying for the use of land during the Second World War, he
wrote:

"These cases reflect the fact that "temporary'

takings which, as here, deny
property,

a

landowner all use of his

are no different in kind from permanent takings,

for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.

"

(70)

Government is required to pay for use of the land

during this period just as an individual would pay rent on
an apartment.

To void the legislation would not be

"a

sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just

Compensation Clause.

"

This would make the taking

(71)

temporary and, as mentioned above, still one which requires
some sort of renumeration.

Pennsylvania Coal

,

Quoting Chief Justice Holmes in

Rehnquist concluded,

"a

strong public

desire to improve the public condition is not enough to

warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." (72)
Full compensation will now play an important role.

Simple payment for property is not enough, interest is
required.

In cities such as New Orleans or Charleston

which have the oldest preservation ordinances in the nation,
a suit for damages,

accumulated over time, could destroy the

city financially.
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.

F.

Compensation and the Transfer of Development
Rights: The Penn Central Decision

Since the 1960s, there had always been a question as to

whether or not designation under

a

otherwise was an over extension of
powers.

If so,

landmarks law,
a

local or

governing body's police

compensation was necessary.

This question

had been answered in numerous Supreme Court decisions that
The question before the

have already been mentioned.

Supreme Court in the Penn Central Transportation Company v
New York City (73) was twofold.

question whether

a

The Court pondered the

city may use historic designation as a

means of preservation "without effecting a "taking'." (74)

The second question was one of compensation: was it
necessary and did it "mitigate whatever financial burdens
appellants have incurred." (75)
The Court decided that designation was not a taking in
this case.

But the Court saw fit to extend its powers of

judicial review and state that the Terminal's air rights

were valuable.

(76)

Since the air rights were valuable,

the Court concluded that "while these rights may well not

have constituted "just compensation', if a "taking' had
occurred, the rights nevertheless mitigated whatever

financial burdens the law has imposed on the appellants..."
(77)

The Court stated that regardless of their value at

this time, they are indeed a valuable commodity.
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In 1978,

due to the rather soft office market in New York City,

undoubtably the value of the Terminal's air rights was not
readily discernible.

In the boom market of 1984, most

certainly the the rights could

easily be sold.

The

Terminal became its own development rights bank, holding
onto its rights and selling as the market demand was
realized.

The Court took a long-term view of the

development rights, realizing that their value at some point

would more than compensate the owners.
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G.

Fred

F.

French Investment Co. v. City of New York

The case of Fred F. French Investment Company v. City
of New York was heard in the Court of Appeals of the State
of New York (the State's highest court).

The City had

through legislative process determined that two private
parks in New York City's Tudor City apartment complex should
The City reacted to the

be zoned for park use only.

Company's plan to build a skyscraper on the site and the
appeals for assistance from the complex's residents.

The

Fred F. French Company held only a security interest in the
properties;

it was not the owner.

The Fred F. French

Investment Company sued the City for an illegal taking of
the property by the City's legislative action.

The City

stated that if a taking had occurred, the investment company

would be compensated by the parks' development rights which
the City allowed to be transferred to an undesignated site

between Sixtieth and Thirty-eighth Streets and Third and

Eighth Avenues.

The investment company reiterated that the

development rights were at best a high risk venture and at
worst, worthless.

The Court stated at the onset of its

decision that the "value of property is not concrete or

tangible attribute but abstraction derived from economic
uses to which property maybe put; thus development rights
are essential component of value of underlying property,

because they constitute some of the economic uses to which

property may be put; such development uses may not be
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disregarded in determining whether

a

zoning ordinance has

destroyed economic value of underlying property." (78)

In

principle, the Court of Appeals recognized the potential

value of

a

site's development rights.

(79)

But while

acknowledging the value of the air rights, the Court
conceded that development rights were of an "uncertain" (80)
market value.

The parks' air rights transformed into

"floating development rights, utterly unsalable until they

could be attached to some accommodating real property,

available by happenstance of prior ownership or by grant,
purchase, or devise,

and subject to the contingent approvals

of administrative agencies.

rights.

..

In such case,

development

float in a limbo until restored to reality by

reattachment to tangible real property.

..

[I]t is a tolerable

abstraction to consider development rights apart from the
solid land from which as a matter of zoning law they
derive.

But severed, the development rights are a double

abstraction until they are actually attached to a receiving
parcel, yet to be identified,

acquired, and subject to the

contingent future approvals of administrative agencies,

events which may never happen because of the exigencies of
the market and the contingencies and exigencies of

The Court noted that the

administrative action." (81)

problem with this above arrangement is that "it fails to
assure preservation of the very real economic value of the

development rights as they existed when still attached to
the underlying property."

(82)
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The intangible nature of

the development rights lead to the Court's decision.

A

body such as a development rights bank would have instantly

insured compensation for the property of the rights under
the State's power of eminent domain.

(83)

The transfer of development rights will be compensation
in the future as long as real estate is considered as such.

As determined in Fred French

,

the development rights of site
.

do have a value attached to the site.

When they are

removed from the site, they lose their value.

The Court

held that the extent to which an ordinance renders a
property unprofitable
occurred.

will determine whether a "taking' has

The Court will also look at how the ordinance

protects the public, what the goals of the ordinance were,
and how they were achieved.

By zoning the parks so no

development could take place, the City completely destroyed
the economic value of the site.

Once it has been

determined that a "taking' has occurred, it must be decided
if compensation has been paid.

The use of transfer of

development rights are uncertain; compensation must be fair
To allow something as

market value-a fixed price.

uncertain as the transfer of development rights to serve as

compensation is to allow for no compensation or below fair
market value compensation to be paid.
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IV.

Transfer of Development Rights
A.

Transfer of Development Rights: Preservation
Planning

Transfer of development rights is

a

concept developed

to account for the disparity between the zoned density for a

particular site and the actual density occupied by the

historic structure.

It is the transfer of the unused yet

allowable development density from one site to another,
The unused yet allowable rights above the landmark

(84)

are sold to the owner of an adjacent site or when

applicable, to the owner of a non-adjacent receiving site.

These rights are sold on the open market as land would be
The purchaser of the rights is permitted to increase

sold.

either height, density, or occupancy levels.
cities,

(85)

In some

such as New York, part of the profits of the sale

are put aside to pay for the support and maintenance of the

historic building.

B.

The Zoned Lot Merger

The development rights that a building has are granted
by a districting scheme that affects all real property in

the City.

(86)

The development rights are not transferable

Primarily, there are two ways

except in certain instances.

of transferring development rights.
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The first is the zoned

It is the simplest example of the transfer of

lot merger.

development rights system.

(87)

It consists of a group of

underdeveloped lots that are joined together or combined in
order to obtain a greater amount of allowable development.
If some of the lots are built upon,

(88)

as is the case

with historic buildings, and the floor area ratio is below
the prescribed amount,

the city permits the additional

construction on any part of the composite site.

The

proposed building with the existing structure is not to
exceed the granted floor to area ratio.

(89)

Laws

regarding lot mergers were developed in 1961 and 1977.
Such notable examples of this kind of transfer are

(90)

the Helmsley Palace Hotel which used the rights of the

Villard Houses, Citibank's Wall Street office which used the
rights of the New York City National Bank at 55 Wall Street,
the tower behind the Racquet and Tennis Club at 370 Park

Avenue,

and Academy House behind the Academy of Music in

Philadelphia.

Proposed zone lot mergers in the recent past

have been announced for the Metropolitan Club on Fifth

Avenue at Fifty nineth Street and the old New York Cancer
Hospital at 103rd Street and Central Park West.

C.

The movement of granted air rights

Transfer of development rights across lots, a

relatively new concept dating from the late 1960s, has
appeared quite strongly in the New York preservation
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scene.

In a city like New York where every available bit

of land in the mid-town business district is precious,

there

is a great deal of pressure on the area's landmarks.

The

lots must be in common ownership in fee or bound together

through a long term lease.
The City established a new type of development control
in the late 1970s.

The unused development potential of a

historically designated lot could be transferred to
contiguous lot.

a

non

This was done to allow for a high level of

light and air over the landmark.

(91)

In 1968,

amendments

to the New York Zoning Resolution permitted the Planning

Commission to authorize transf errance to specific adjacent
lots.

The resolution stated that the air rights maybe

transferred to a contiguous lot, to one across the street
from the landmark, or diagonally across an intersection.
The maximum FAR overage on the transfer site was not to

exceed 20 percent.

The amount of transferable floor area

is derived by subtracting the existing floor area of the

landmark building from the allowable area.

The transferred

floor area is irrevocably subtracted from the site and a

plan for the preservation and maintenance of the landmark
must be submitted to the City Planning Commission.

(92)

This was amended in 1969 to allow for the a chain of
ownership.

A chain was determined to be a group of

properties owned out-right by a single individual.

The

properties could qualify as a chain of ownership if the
owner of one property securred a legal agreement with the
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)

owners between his site and and the landmark site.

When

agreement must be long term.
protection,

a

The

specific area needs

it is within the powers of the City to create

special preservation and receiving zones for the rights.

(93)

The transfer of development rights system is viewed by

many as a friend to the beleaguered urban landmark.

Transfers do not add to the bulk of the city such would be
the case zoning bonuses.

work. Space Adrift

,

John J. Costonis wrote in his

that the transfer of development rights

maintains the status quo by the creation of a transfer of

development rights receiving zone superimposed upon the

existing business district.

(94)

Costonis wrote,

"Cities

adopting the version of the Chicago Plan under which
transfer districts encompass areas of landmark concentration

merely redistribute the density that has already been

authorized for these areas by the zoning code; they do not
create additional density as in the the case of zoning
bonuses.

"

(95

There have been some rather noticeable instances of

transferred development rights.

Amster Yard involves the a

transfer of unused development rights that were granted for
a historic block of rowhouses with a central court.

The

transfer was delayed for six years when the New York office

market became soft.

Grand Central Terminal and the South

Street Seaport District are two other examples of

transferred development potential.
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A more recent one is

the recommendation for the creation of a special Broadway-

Theater District similar to the Seaport District in its

employment of transfer of development rights.

(96)

The transfer of the development rights of historic

structures

has been used to protect some rather important

structures and areas of New York City.

But is it a

friendly means of preservation or does it create chaos?
Most certainly, the movement of development rights could
cause an urban planning nightmare.

As Norman Marcus wrote

in his summation of transferring air rights and the City
plan,

"

A well understood plan at the outset avoids the

unpredictable dealing of discretionary TDR wild cards down
the road."

(97)

Compared with the zoned lot merger, the

transfer of landmark development rights allows for

a

sounder

movement of the City's bulk because of its many safety
features.

In order for both the City's historic

its livable present to be preserved,

past and

the landmark transfer

must be made more attractive than the zoned lot merger.
The landmark transfer is futile in the absence of a sound

plan and fixed municipal control.
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V.

The Chicago Plan
A. An Introduction

The Chicago Plan is the brainchild of John J. Costonis
in his book, Space Adrift; Landmark Preservation and the

Space Adrift and its Chicago Plan was

Marketplace

.

Costonis

attempt to reverse the trend of destruction that

's

afflicts our nation's "urban centrally located building in

private ownership..." (98)

A central feature of the Plan

is its utilization of transfer of development rights as a

means of preserving landmarks of the Chicago School of

Architecture.

The development rights are moved or

transferred to another site, allowing the owner of the
receiving site to build a taller than zoned structure.

The

payment to the owner of the landmark for his development
rights is supposed to relieve some of the economic pressures
on him to demolish his low-level landmark and replace it

with a taller, more profitable structure.

(99)

The Chicago Plan attempts to avoid some of the

constitutional issues already mentioned.

Notably, the

Chicago Plan squarely addresses the question of adequate
compensation for the landmark owner.
case,

In the F red F

.

French

one saw that the development rights were only as

valuable as the market and only if immediately attached to

another receiving site.

Costonis has anticipated this

dilemma by his insistence on a municipal development rights
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bank to absorb the rights as they appear on the market.

This will be explained in further detail.

From a density perspective, Costonis defends his plan
against critics who would state that the transfer of

Costonis states

development rights increases density.

that, compared to zoning bonuses which add density to the

urban scene, transfer of development rights does not add to
the city's density.

Bonus space, wrote Costonis,

is added

"ex nihilo by the city... bonus programs inject new

increments of density into the community." (100)
of development rights on the other hand,

space,

Transfer

"do not create new

they merely redistribute space that has already been

authorized." (101)

B.

The Chicago Plan and Planning

One problem with the Chicago Plan is its reliance on
the municipality's planning office.

willing to do

a great deal of

to be fully effective.

The city must be

homework in order for the Plan
What influenced the Supreme

(102)

Court's decision in the Penn Central case was its belief
that the New York Landmarks Preservation Commission based
its decisions on a well thought out plan.

(103)

This

protected the Commission from charges of reverse spot
zoning.

Costonis points out two specific reasons why

planning is of such importance for the Chicago Plan: first,
transfer of development rights, as well as incentive
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The incentive

programs are part of an overall scheme.
program must augment,

not hinder,

the goals of the munici-

pality as set forth in its municipal plan.

(104)

Secondly,

an incentive program that allows for either zoning bonuses
or development rights

transfers must be "sensitively

correlated with the prescribed amenity's capacity to offset
the building's greater bulk.

[With] development rights

transfers, the redistribution of the low density use's

excess rights must not occur at the cost of disrupting
either the area's public services or its dimensional scale."
(105)

C.

The Foundation of the Chicago Plan

The Chicago Plan,

with its techniques of transferred

rights, uses four points inherent in today's landmark
First, many landmarks are of a

problems as a foundation.

lower density than allowed by current zoning.

(106)

Second, most landmarks are capable of returning a profit to

their owners.

Their problem is one of the

"dispropor-

tionate value of their sites in relation to the landmark

buildings."

(107)

Third, these landmarks are usually to be

found in the compact, high density business sectors of our

cities.

(108)

And finally, public facilities and services

are most often plentiful in these areas,

people to be absorbed with

a

allowing for more

greater efficiency. (109)
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These four characteristics form the foundation of

a

preservation plan with which the city can employ development
rights transfers.

They are the point of departure.

(110)

A city council can slowly build its transfer plan into its
existing code, adding the necessary ground work for

implementation of the plan.

a full

The goals of a transfer

program should be to preserve the historic landmark, cause a
minimum of disruption on the cityscape, keep the structure
on the city's tax rolls, minimize acquisition in fee of

buildings and retain the buildings original use when it is

economically feasible for such a continued use.

These four

elements of the Chicago Plan are the incentive package, the

development rights transfer district, the preservation
restriction,

and the development rights bank.
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D.

The Incentive Package

The incentive program begins with a landmark commission

appraisal of the economic consequences of its designation of
Once this is determined, the commission will

a property.

formulate a financial package that includes a real estate
tax reduction,

in accordance with most existing state laws,

and an authorization to transfer the landmark's unused

development rights.

(Ill)

Subsidies to cover losses may

come in the form of additional development rights from the

municipal development rights bank.

The city would either

calculate the value of a site's air rights on a case-by-case
basis or periodically update an index of the value of the

development rights at stated increments for all parcels in
the rights transfer district.

(112)

Costonis states that

the tax reduction would make the incentive package most

attractive because "tax savings will have a dramatic impact

upon the profitability of landmark buildings." (113)

E.

The Preservation Restriction

The preservation restriction is to insure that the

owners of the landmark will continue to preserve the source
of those rights.

The preservation restriction allows the

owner to qualify for various tax benefits.

(114)

The city

can not acquire all of its historic buildings, but it is, of
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course,

To establish a

committed to their preservation.

type of covenant that runs with the land will insure its

continued integrity

.

The preservation restriction should

include the legal authority upon which the restriction is
based; restriction on use; covenants forbidding demolition
or alteration;

restoration requirements and maintenance

obligations; remedies for failure to return a reasonable
profit; and duration of the restriction.

(115)

Each of

these conditions will vary according to each municipalities
laws and degree of preservation standards.

F.

The Development Rights Transfer District

The third component of the Chicago Plan is the

development rights transfer district.

The rights, as

mentioned earlier must be part of a well considered plan.
The transfer of development rights district must fit into
this plan.

There are two techniques for determining where

the receiving district is to be located.

The district can

either be founded in conjunction with the area with the

highest concentration of landmarks or independent of this
core area.
The first type of district is best illustrated by the

recently proposed Special Theater District in New York.
(116) The receiving district for the rights in the Theater

District

overlap the Core Theater District.

zone umbrellas the preservation zone.
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The receiving

Instead of having

the transferred rights move solely to an adjacent site,

can be moved freely throughout the district.
be remembered,

they

But it must

the public facilities and services must be

able to support the increased bulk and usage.

(117)

Allowing for a freer movement of air rights prevents
buildings of undimensional scale being placed at the end of,
for example,

a block of row houses.

The second type of district

is where the air rights

are transferred away from the core area.

This is best

illustrated by the Georgetown Waterfront Historic District
in Washington D.C.

(118)

Simply, the development rights

from the waterfront were transferred to a specific zone that

encompassed lots which bordered the route of Washington's
new Metro system.

It was anticipated that the advent of

the subway would warrant greater density allotments.

(119)

The density along the proposed route was not increased.

Already determined rights from the waterfront district were
made available to be transferred from the point of origin to
the new subway corridor.

This use of transfer of

development rights made up for the discrepancy between
available rights found along the subway route and needed
rights along the route.

G.

The Municipal Development Rights Bank

The final feature of the Chicago Plan is the municipal

development rights bank.

The municipal development rights
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)

bank has already been mentioned in relation to the Fred

French Investment Company case.

F.

With a bank ready and able

to buy the rights, they no longer would have been
The landmark owner would always have a place

speculative.

to sell his development rights.

The bank would derive its

supply of development rights from three sources.

The first

source is from landmarks in immediate danger of demolition.
The city would first give the owner of the property an

option to sell the rights to either the bank or on the open
If the owner refused,

market.

the city could use its power

of eminent domain to acquire the building's development

rights in fee and pay the owner compensation for his loss.
(120)

The second group of landmarks is also in private

ownership. These development rights would be transferred to
the bank by donations.

There would be specific tax

advantages to donating the rights compared with selling them
to the bank.

(121)

These benefits would have to be written

into the municipal tax code if there was no provision for
this sort of donation.

Municipally owned landmarks are the third source of
development rights.

Since many distinguished buildings are

publicly owned, this could be a considerable source of
income for the development rights bank.

By transferring

these rights to the bank, the "city can enroll an otherwise

dormant municipal resource in the service of a worthy public
purpose.

"

(122
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These are the basic components of the Chicago Plan.

Most municipal programs that contain a development rights

transfer technique have followed, at least in part, the

Chicago Plan.

New York City's transfer of development

rights program is one of the more fully developed rights

programs in the country.

It,

however, does have its

differences with the Chicago Plan.
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The New York City Program
A.

Introduction

The New York City statute was amended in 1968 to allow
for the transfer of development rights.

It authorized the

Planning Commission to oversee the transfer of rights from
landmark to a specific adjacent lot.

a

The adjacent lot was

defined as either contiguous, across a street or across an
intersection.

(123)

In 1969,

the term adjacent site was

redefined to include linked tracts of land that could

conceivably span more than one street. The new definition

permitted "an air rights transfer to any lot in a chain of
common ownership, as long as the first link in the chain is
across the street from or contiguous to a landmark site.
(124)

Increases in bulk were not to exceed 20 percent of

the unused rights.

The transfer could be made to one or

several adjacent sites.
The new building was required to meet specific

standards of design.

The new building had to be compatible

in scale to the landmark.

The owner of the landmark must

use part of his profits from the sale of the air rights to

create a trust fund for the maintenance of the landmark.
The specific maintenance program was to be worked out by the

Landmarks Preservation Commission on a case-by-case basis.
(125)

In the 1970s, the transfer of development rights
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program's guidelines were relaxed to allow for three
things.

The first was the right to utilize a structure's

full development potential.

Full transfer of unused

development rights could now be transferred to
in a high density, commercial district.

a

single site

The second was the

initiation of the area wide plan for transferring and
receiving development rights.

(126)

This is similar to

Costonis's development rights transfer zone.

The third was

the separate creation of a receiving zone such as one would

find employed at the South Street Seaport District.

Here,

the development rights zone and the commercial zone do not

overlap due to the special, historic nature of the
Seaport.

To

retain its character fully, it was insured

that the development zone with its increased bulk would be

away from the historic area so as not to destroy its
character and scale.
of New York

'

s

The South Street Seaport is only one

areas that has used the transfer of

development rights to insure its financial security and
retain its historic character.
The fundamental difference between the transfer of

development rights program as it evolved in the 1970s and
the zoned lot merger technique,

its chief rival,

is the

presence of a specific preservation component in the
transfer program.
structure,

The zoned lot merger can occur for any

at any contiguous lot.

The zoned lot merger

does not entail the movement of rights across lots of

different ownership.

It is simply the combination of a lot,
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in this

instance

a

landmark lot, with an adjoining lot.

The

zoning potential of the site is newly determined to

incorporate the increased size of the lot minus the existing
bulk of the building that is retained.

B.

Amster Yard

Amster Yard

,

a small

residential enclave on the eastern

side of Manhattan's mid-town was one of the first projects
The site is an ensemble of

to utilize the 1968 resolution.

privately owned nineteenth century residences and commercial

structures with
block.

a

communal garden in the interior of the

Amster Yard is east of Third Avenue between

Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Streets.

The owner of the

landmarked property offered for sale his unused air rights
to an adjacent parcel on Third Avenue where an office tower

was planned.

(127)

The air rights sold for $494,731.

$100,000 of this amount was eventually set aside to be used
as a trust fund for the maintenance of the site.

(128)

The

five trustees of the fund were chosen from the significant

Sadly, this original plan

players in the transfer group.

failed due to the failure of the New York office space

market in the mid 1970s.
The Amster Yard plan was revived in a somewhat

different form in the early 1980s.

A

restrictive

declaration was signed instead of forming
fund.

a

The declaration was in favour of the
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new trust

New York Landmarks Conservancy. The owner received $35,000
for immediate repairs and maintenance and covenanted to

provide regular maintenance for the structure and be subject
to periodic inspections of the landmark.

The Conservancy

was granted the power to compel that work be done.

They

were allowed to enter into a contractual agreement with a

contractor if the organization felt that necessary work was
not being done to the Yard.

(129)

The owner of Amster Yard

did not receive any additional compensation for the sale of
the air rights.
As can be seen,

the transfer of Amster Yard's deve-

lopment rights could be completed despite New York's soft

office market.

F red F

attempted transfer in

a

.

French is an example of another
soft,

unsure market.

These two

cases illustrate the two sets of events that can occur when
the market for new construction is weak and an attempt is

made to transfer development rights.

The owner of the air

rights needs

Amster Yard had found

a buyer

a

buyer for his rights.

for its rights:

the sale was made.

the developer, not the landmark owner.

If

The loser was
the Fred F.

French organization had been able to find an immediate buyer
for its rights, the case would not have occurred.

C.

South Street Seaport District

The South Street Seaport District is an enclave south
of the Brooklyn Bridge in Manhattan, consisting mostly of
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two hundred year old buildings.

It is the last waterfront

area in Manhattan representative of New York's maritime

prowess during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The district surrounds the Fulton Fish Market.

The area is

unquestionably historic, but it was also clearly an
uneconomic use of land in an area that was experiencing an
economic boom in land prices.
The South Street Seaport District is significant for
two reasons.

The first is that the preservation area and

the redevelopment area are drawn so as to not overlap as one

discovers with the Mid-town Theater District recently
proposed.

This prevents these diminutive historic buildings

from becoming overwhelmed by modern behemoths.

The second

significance is the introduction of private-sector

commercial banks to act as the transfer of development
rights bank instead of the City fulfilling that role.
the outset of the venture,

At

it was decided that multiple

transfers would be allowed.

This meant that the owner of

the historic properties were allowed to convey his

development rights to either the bank or directly into the

market-sector receiving lot.

(130)

The banks released

their mortgages on the properties, thus enabling the owners
to "convey their development rights and secure investment"
(131)

for the maintenance or rehabilitation of their

landmarks.

The middleman was the consortium of banks that

initially released their mortgages.

These banks served as

the repository for the preservation area's development
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rights.

As warranted, they would move rights to

predetermined receiving sites in the redevelopment
This predesignation of development parcels

district.

circumvents the problem of floating rights.

The presence

of a rights bank insures the immediate purchase of the

rights.

The rights are now marketable and the variable of

speculation and undetermined risk are removed, thus

preventing a reoccurrence of a Fred French problem.

As an

added benefit, the transfer rights were not used for
increases in height, but increased the permissible amount of
tower coverage of

a

specific lot.

This allowed for the

retention of the area height as zoned, resulting in some
degree of height compatibility for the area.
In one example,

(132)

300,000 square feet of air rights were

purchased from the development rights bank.

Tower coverage

The sale generated $1,500,000, a

restrictions were waived.

figure below the area's square footage rate for land.

The

proceeds of the sale were used to balance the books on the
forgiven mortgage debt.

Other buildings in the area

purchased 142,868 square feet and 275,000 square feet from
the development rights bank.

In 1984,

there was still over

a half of a million square feet left in the development

rights bank.

D.

(133)

Tudor City

The failure of New York's transfer of development
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rights program is best illustrated by its Tudor City

proposal.

This proposal was the impetus for the F red F.

French case.

Tudor City is a group of apartment houses

that surround two small open parks.

The site is located on

Forty-second Street between First and Second Avenues.

The

Tudor City proposal was an attempt by the City to move

development rights from the small parks which the residents
of the complex lobbied to save from development to a

location in the central mid-town area.
York,

The City of New

in response to the lobbying efforts of the residents,

created a Special Parks District, zoning the park sites to a
level of zero density.

As mentioned earlier in the

evaluation of the case, the Courts found that to create such
a

zone for the parks was an overextension of the City's

police powers.

The transferred rights were deemed to be of

an uncertain value and,

therefore, not adequate compensation

for the density mandate by the City.
The City, in its desire to preserve much needed green

space and answer to its constituents wishes, created

a

floating zone transfer of development rights system for the

owner of the Tudor City air rights. (134)
Yard or South Street Seaport

Unlike Amster

with their predetermined

sites, the Tudor City owners were told by the City that they
own these air rights.

However, they must not only find a

purchaser for the rights, but the site for them as well.
This was certainly the cause for the failure of the City to

win its suit.

Whether the rights originate from an
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adjacent site or from

a

predetermined preservation zone, the

rights must be able to withstand the market into which they
are thrust.

To allow for the transfer of development

rights to an adjacent site partly shields the municipality
from judicial challenge due to the fact that the rights will
be transferred when the non-landmark site is ready for

development.

When there is a specific zone or group of

sites designated to receive the rights, the question of

where the rights are to go is answered.

mentioned in conjunction with the Fred

However, as
F.

French case, the

only sure way that transfer of development rights will work
in such a situation as with Tudor City is for there to be a

development rights bank.
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VII

.

Economics
A.

The Economics of Transfer of Development Rights

The transfer of development rights is above all an

economic program.
profitable.

Its goal is to make urban landmarks

The example in Space Adrift uses four

landmarks in Chicago's Loop to formulate a methodology for

computing the cost per square foot for development rights.
Those examples are as good as any to illustrate a

(135)

formulative process for determining costs.

The costs of

the development rights will vary from site to site.

example,

As an

the development rights sold to the Philip Morris

Corporation for their world headquarters sold for twice the
market rate for land in the vicinity; at Amster Yard, the
rights sold for a bit below market rates.

New construction which involves transferred development
rights must still be guided by a developer's desire to

maintain a low level of costs and a high level of profit.
The new building must have a square footage of at least

28,000 per floor for a satisfactory return.

As much square

footage as possible should be accommodated on the lower
floors, primarily the first,

second and third floors.

The

shape of the new building should approximate a square as

closely possible to allow for an efficient use of space and
to allow for the greatest amount of rental space..

(136)

cost increase of 8 percent per floor over the cost per
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A

square foot for the construction of those floors is assumed
as the cost growth rate.

This is according to the

(137)

Marshall Valuation Service.

The cost of construction

increases as a building becomes taller due to increase in
time,

labour,

and construction costs.

We will assume a

construction cost figure of $50 per square foot for the
first through the third floors.

This figure is not derived

from any actual figure used in New York's real estate
market.

A recent New York Times article regarding the

proposed Theater District placed the value of land at $40
/square foot.
floors,

With construction costs for the first three

one can assume that the cost will be greater than

the the price of acquisition due to other factors which must
be taken into account.

Certain assumptions are made at the outset.
floor has an area of 30,000 square feet.

Each

The construction

cost for the first three floors is $50 per square foot.

This is the starting point.
1)

total square footage-floors 1,2,3

30,000

2)

X

3

= 90,000

sq ft

total construction cost for floors 1,2,3
$50 per sq ft x 90,000 sq ft = $4,500,000

The as-of-right height for the site is 20 stories.

The cost growth for the next 17 stories must be

determined.

First must be determined the total square

footage for the rest of the building.
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3)

total square footage-floors 4-20

30,000

4)

17 = 510,000 sq ft

X

total construction cost for floors 4-20 with

cost growth of 8% per floor carried to the 17th

power

510,000

X

$50

X

(1.08)-^^ = $94,350,460

The cost per square foot for the twenty story building
is determined by dividing the total cost of construction by

the square footage of the building.
5)

cost per square foot.

The total construction

cost for the building is divided by the the
total square footage.

$98,850,460/(90,000

510,000) = $164.75psf

+

total cost equals the addition of the

figures in steps

2

and 4

The developer of the site agrees to purchase an

additional five floors worth of develpment rights to
increase the height of his building and obtain more valuable
rental space.

The market rate for land in the

neighbourhood averages to $20 per square foot.

The

negotiated price for the development rights is $18 per
square foot.
6)

total square footage for the additional five
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floors

.

30,000

X

150,000

=

5

The additional air rights will increase the amount of

square footage in the building by 150,000.

The acquisition

cost for the rights is this amount times the cost per square
foot for those rights.
7)

acquisition cost
$18

X

150,000

=

$2,700,000

The total cost for the construction of this building

with an additional five stories is determined by using the
initial figure for the construction of the first three
stories, $50 per square foot.

However, this time the the

height of the building is twenty five stories, not twenty.
The base figure of 4.5 million dollars is not changed.

The

costs for floors 4-25 are determined.
8)

total square footage of floors 4-25
22 X 30,000 = 660,000 sq ft

The next step is to determine a construction cost per

square foot which encorapases the additional five floors.
9)

construction cost for floors 4-25.

The

figure is carried out to the 22nd power.

660,000

In

X

$50 X

(1.08)^^ = $179,405,833

step 9, it was determined what the cost of
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construction cost of the the first three stories of $4.7
million will be added to this figure to determine a final

construction cost.
10)

Total cost of construction

$4,500,000 + $179,410,000 = $183,910,000

Added to this figure is the cost of acquiring the
additional air rights
11)

$183,910,000 + $2,700,000 = $186,610,000

The cost per square foot for the twenty five story

building is dtermined by dividing the figure derived in step
11

by the total square footage of the building.
12)

cost per square foot

$186,610,000/750,000 = $248.80psf

The cost of the building with the development rights is
of course higher than the cost for the twenty story

building; the cost of acquisition must be figured in the
final cost.

By subtracting the cost per square foot for

the as-of -right building from the cost per square of the

building with the development rights, one can determine the
cost per square foot for the additional floor space.

The

additional floor space cost an additional $84 per square
foot.

While it may seem that the cost of preservation and

transfer of development rights makes such a program

63

unattractive, one must remember that certain factors are

present that will mitigate such losses.

First of all,

there is the fact that office space on higher floors command

higher rates.
recovered there.

Part of the acquisition cost can be
Secondly,

new construction in the central

area of mid-town will be able to sell at going market rate
or higher as the building is new and it is creating new and

needed space in the area.

The rental rate for the building

depends on maintenance costs, rate of recapture of the
investment, market rate,

and other factors.

A complete

study of the relationship between development rights, rental
rates,

Adrift.

and recapture is to be found in chapter four of Space
(138)
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Transfer Systems

VIII.
A.

Types of systems

As we have seen, three types of transfer systems exist
for development rights and are utilized in New York.: the

adjacent lot; the receiving zone, both the overlapping and
the separate zones; and the unlimited free zone.

The free

zone is discredited and ill-advised for use as part of a

transfer program due to its inability to withstand

constitutional challenge at this time under existing
Its future is uncertain and with preservation

conditions.

and the transfer of development rights facing risks both in
the courts and the varied market place,

its use is not

The remaining two systems are the most likely to

feasible.

Both are currently in the New York press as the

succeed.

City attempts to preserve two of its famous resources: Grand
Central Terminal and the Broadway Theater.

B.

Grand Central and the question of adjacency

The transfer of development rights from Grand Central

has been a source of much publicity and confusion for more
than a decade.

One of the first buyers of the Grand

Central air rights was Philip Morris Corporation, Inc.

Philip Morris entered into negotiations with the Terminal
when it was decided that it was to build its new world
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headquarters across the street from the Terminal at Forty
second Street and Park Avenue.

Philip Morris needed

additional height and tower coverage to make its 200,000
square foot lot more economically feasible.

(139)

Philip

Morris acquired the equivalent of three more stories in

height from the Terminal at a price that was twice the
current rate for land in that area.

(140)

The New York

City transfer of development rights program allows for

a

receiving site to increase its overage by 20 percent.

The

City relaxed this provision that dates from 1958 to permit
the transfer of all of the development potential to a single
site in a high density commercial district without regard to
the 20 percent limit.

This was done in 1975 in response to

requests by Penn Central.
Recently,

a

(141)

proposed transfer of rights from Grand

Central has been in the newspapers.

Grand Central has

agreed to sell its air rights to a site at 383 Madison

Avenue

—a

Terminal.

site which lies three blocks away from the

What makes the transfer controversial is not

only the number of rights that were transferred to one site,
but the basis of the railroad's claim that the sites are

adjacent.
The proposition for 383 Madison involves the

construction of a building that is 74 stories tall north of
the Terminal.

The tower's developer. First Boston

Corporation, proposed to use 800,000 square feet of the

Terminal's air rights.

The site is within the high density
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mid-town commercial area.

The allowable bulk of the site

The additional air rights

is a mere 600,000 square feet.

would more than double the bulk allowed on the site.

This

proposal involves a complicated set of legal, planning, and
landmark issues.

(142)

As mentioned earlier, the transfer of development

rights program in New York allows for the transfer to

adjacent lots, across streets or diagonally across

intersections.

Development rights can also be moved

through a chain of ownership to a distant yet adjacent by
virtue of the chain of ownership site.

(143)

Penn Central,

it is claimed by the First Boston Corporation's lawyer

Edward N. Costikyan, may have sold its surface rights, but
"it retained "subsurface'

ownership rights to the land

underneath them, much of which includes the railroad
tracks".
new.

(144)

The idea of separate estates of land is not

Again one can see that the question of surface and
Similar to the

sub-surface rights has yet to resolved.

claim made in Pennsylvania Coal

,

Penn Central claims that it

has not sold its sub-surface rights and thus claim that it
is this underground chain of ownership that allows for the

transfer to the distant yet adjacent site.
their claim,

According to

it is only at the Grand Central site that their

ownership extends both up to the stars and down to the
center of the earth.

Ownership of the sub-surface tracks

creates a horizontal chain of title.

If one can imagine a

rectangular piece of wood with another piece of wood placed
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perpendicularly above it.

The vertical piece of wood would

represent the landmark site that is Grand Central
Terminal.

The horizontal piece of wood represents the

sub-surface rights of the Terminal that are the rights of
the railroad tracks.

The surface rights above the tracks

were sold off when the tracks were covered

.

If

the

argument is upheld in court, it is believed that the
railroad could "argue for a chain that follows its tracks
out of town".

(145)

As a planning issue

,

it has rather severe repercus-

sions.

This would be the largest sale air rights to take

place.

Such a large sale for this particular site would

create an increase in density that is, in the words of the
New York Times, "a mistake, a massive mistake."
area

made

is now one of New York's most congested.
a

(146)

The

The City

sound planning decision when it determined that the

site was to be zoned for 600,000 square feet.

To more than

double the size of the building on the site would be
planning madness.

The Times mentioned salient points:

"Even with tunnels to Grand Central, its workers and

visitors would further pack already crowded sidewalks;

deliveries would further pack already crowded streets, and
the whole would pile new weight on the growing mid-town

crush."

(147)

For landmarks, the outcome of 383 Madison could mean

disaster.

One of the central results of the Supreme

Court's Penn Central decision was its recognition of the

68

potential of selling the landmark's unused air rights as
means of compensation.

If a taking had occurred,

a

the value

of the air rights might have been viewed as an adequate form
of compensation.

The Supreme Court stated that the

Terminal's air rights helped to mitigate any financial
burden imposed on the owners due to designation.

This is

based on the assumption that the rights can be sold.

If

the City Council does not allow the rights to be sold, they
are in essence,

rebutting the claim that the rights have

If they are worthless,

value.

occurred.

a

then perhaps a taking had

This could make the extent of the legislative

imposition so great that the court could claim that to
designate a landmark is an over-extension of police
powers.

The New York Times wrote aptly when it cited the

potential threat to the Terminal:

"If its owners are unable

to apply their air rights on one of the other sites, the

Terminal's landmark status would be imperiled." (148)

Rising behind Mercury, one could again see

a

Breueresque

project atop Grand Central Terminal.

An application for the transfer was made to the City
Planning Department in August 1986.

This was followed by a

preliminary draft environmental impact statement in October
1986.

A revised draft was submitted in November of 1987.

The Planning Department never certified the developer's

application as complete for public land-use review.

Early

this year the developer went to court to force the issue.
(149)
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Last month, the State Supreme Court ordered the City to
act on certification within 30 days,

after the developer

submits specific information on air quality and traffic
The City is appealing the decision.

impact.

(150)

The Broadway Theater District

C.

The New York Theater has been for many years the crown
jewel of the theatrical world.

To be "on Broadway" was

indeed an honour and to "play the Palace" meant that one was
at the apex of his career.

seventies,

But since the early to mid

the New York theater on Broadway has declined,

many theaters remain empty: still more have been demolished
or are used for non-legitimate theater.

Following the

demolition of the Morosco Helen Hayes Theaters,

a

group of

concerned actors and citizens, along with the City's
blessings,

founded the Theater Advisory Council.

The Theater Advisory Council created a report entitled
To Preserve the Broadway Theater

.

(151)

The report focused

on a specific area of theaters that are located in what has

been designated by the Council as the Core Theater

District.

Amongst its recommendations for the Core Theater

District are landmarking by the Landmarks Preservation
Commission, preservation covenants, and historic
districting.

It outlines criteria for evaluation of

economic hardship and restrictions in scale and use.

A

central feature of the report is its recommendation that the
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transfer of development rights tool as a means of
preservation.

The Report follows standard City policy on

the transf errance of rights: across streets and

intersections, chain of ownership, etc.

The report

(152)

also allows for certain zoning bonuses and development
benefits.

These include "waiver of height and setback
The neighbourhood west of Broadway is

zoning rules." (153)

of a generally small scale.

There is an attempt to retain

not only the scale of the surrounding neighbourhood by

placing it outside the receiving zone, but to protect it
further by the creation of a suggested Broadway Theater

Historic District.

The receiving zone for the Core

District's air rights is concentrated between Sixth and
Eighth Avenues and along Forty second Street.

(154)

However, the area is sure to be placed under shadow as the
larger buildings, the result of transferred rights and
bonuses,

spring up along the fringe of the area.

Also,

there is no component in the Report to prevent the usual

increase in rents that accompanies historic districting.
The neighbourhood not only is home to many New Yorkers, but
is also a place of business for many of the support services

for the theater trade.

While the theaters are justly

slated for preservation and there is some realization that
the neighbourhood's scale is to be retained, there is no

attempt to retain the character of the area.

Transfer of development rights must be part of a

well-considered plan in order for it to be accepted by the
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public,

developers,

Without such

a plan,

sellers of air rights and the courts.
the repercussions to the surrounding

Admittedly,

area could be disastrous.
of the future,

this is a projection

but as development spreads through the area,

the fringe area west of Eighth Avenue to the river will most

certainly be affected.

Integrated with the Theater plan

must be a larger preservation plan for the area which would

attempt to protect the scale and the theatrical support

industries such as lighting shops, scenery studios, actors'
workshops, and theatrical bookshops which contribute

significantly to the theatrical character of Broadway.
The Theater Advisory Council's recommended transfer of

development rights program is as follows.

The Council

extended to theater owners the right to move unused
development rights to a receiving zone which overlaps the
Core Theater District.

The transfers would occur on the

condition that the theater owner/renter into a covenant with
the City.

(155)

the theater.

The covenant would run with the deed of

The covenant,

as stated in the Report,

"would

bind the theater owner and his successors not to demolish
the theater and to use [the theater] as a legitimate

theater." (156)

Appropriate short term provisions would be

allowed for non-theater uses during so-called dark
periods.

The owner of the theater would be required to pay

over a portion of his receipts from the sale of the air

rights to the New York City Theater Trust.

Trust is a recommendation of the Report.
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The Theater

Theater owner

Robert Nederlander has stated that the cost to run a theater
is $250,000 a year.

This sum, according to Nederlander is

"insufficient to induce owners to forgo the sole potential
of a non-economic property for a non-theater use."

Nederlander

'

s

(157)

prediction is illustrated by the

following example, also found in The New York Times.
a

Under

scheme called the Theater Retention Bonus, the owner of a

development site within the theater district, but outside
the core, could increase the size of the new building by one

FAR through payment to the owner of a theater site.

For

example, on a 30,000 square foot avenue site, the developer
is allowed to build a 450,000 square foot building.

With

additional square footage from the transferred rights, the
total square footage for the site would be 480,000 square
The price per square foot for the additional 30,000

feet.

square feet is assumed at $40 a square foot: the average
price of land in the area.

The Times assumes a return of 8 percent with the

million.
money.

The sale price would be $1.2

The return would be $96,000 a year with a return

calculated to be somewhat lower, possibly $57,000, after
taxes.

(158)

The sale of the rights through the Theater Retention

scheme would not prohibit the theater owner from selling his
rights to

a

neighbouring building plot.

This, however,

not a practical option for many mid-block theater owners.

The use of the bonus would obligate the theater owner to

sign the above mentioned covenant.
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Gerald Schoenfeld of

is

the Shubert Organization stated that the covenant was too

"hefty" to assume for an increase of one FAR.

(159)

The problem with the retention bonus is that the

available development rights in the core area is estimated
to be approximately three million square feet.

The

purchase of one FAR is too small

a

owners of these unused rights.

To use up that much under

figure to compensate the

the bonus plan would require 150 sites of 20,000 square

feet.

It

is not known if that many sites of that size

exist in the transfer receiving zone.

The plan as it now

exists does not show any relationship to the facts.

The

theater owners do not care for the plan because they feel
that the return is too little to support the operation of a

theater.

The City did not thoroughly do its planning

homework to determine if their increases were feasible given
the area.

The transfer of the theaters' development rights

are viewed by Nederlander and the Times as the sole form of

return for the theaters.

development rights as
problems.

a

The City views the transfer of

panacea for the theaters'

The transfer of devlopment rights should be but

one part of a plan to aid in the revitilization of the

Broadway stage.

As it appears today,

the plan will be

utilized by a limited number of theater owners.
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IX.

The Issues of Transfer of Development Rights
A. Are the benefits of the transfer enjoyed equally

by all?

Many issues surround the question of transfer of
Regardless of the system employed

development rights.
(adjacency,

receiving zone, or free zone) questions arise as

to whether transfer of development rights is the correct

option to choose.

When planners or preservationists decide

to utilize a transfer program,

it must be the best choice

according to the given situation.

The planning results

could affect future generations.

But at the time of the

transfer, the question exists: does everyone benefit from
the transfer?

The removal of air rights in one area surely

affects the receivers due to the receivers
and air and strain upon existing services.
an adjacent transfer,

'

loss of light
In the case of

the parties subject to the results are

the same: the benefits of the transfer are readily

accessible to those affected by the transfer at the
outset.

Benefits such as the retention of scale and light

and air are just to name a few.

receiving zone system,

In the case of the

if the receiving zone is in close

proximity to the preservation zone, again one can readily
discern that both parties are beneficiaries to the
transfer's best results.

However,

if the receiving zone is

some distance away or the system in place is of the free

zone type, the benefits for those encumbered by the
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increased bulk are not as clearly defined.
For example,

the City of New York may decide that it is

in its best interest to preserve important midtown

landmarks.

The City decides that it will create a special

Fifth Avenue Landmarks Preservation zone, restricting the
amount of density which would be allowed in the area.

As a

means of compensation, the City approves a transfer of

development rights program.

However,

for the rights is the Upper West Side,
a

boom in residential real estate.

the receiving zone
an area experiencing

On the surface it seems

that the City has made a good decision: the landmarks are
saved,

the developers are compensated,

and the people

yearning to live on the Upper West Side are happy.

But the

result of such a system creates such towers as Television

Do the residents of the neighbourhood derive any

City.

benefit from the transfer?
air,

They lose precious light and

their support services are strained,

and mass transit,

slowly recovering on the Upper West Side, is pushed to its
limit.

The benefits for the residents of the area are few

while those in midtown are great: less congestion, light,
air,

aesthetic environment.

While it is true that the

argument could be made that the preservation zone is readily
acceptable, there are other possible examples where this is
not the case.

A true-life example occurred when the City

proposed that in order to alleviate the congestion and
high-level density of the Wall Street area, air rights for
the Customs House could be transferred across New York Bay
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and to the Staten Island greenbelt.

The benefits for the

residents of Staten Island are far less clear than the
earlier example.
In order for a transfer of development rights program

to survive

public challenge, the public must first see that

it is beneficial to them.

Costonis states in Space Adrift

that the public is behind the preservation movement.
I

must agree.

(160)

The preservation movement in the United

States has grown immensely in the past decade.

People

across the nation are no longer blindly accepting change,

as

the challenge over the Columbus Circle site in New York

attests.

The ideas of scale and human environment are

important to the man on the street.

To allow a transfer

program to spawn a building such as Columbus Center is to
doom it to failure.

Preservation in the United States came

from the action of its citizens; they should all benefit
from it.
The South Street Seaport District has most certainly

allowed for the benefits of density transfers to be enjoyed
by all.

The movement of the development rights to the

immediate south along Water Street has created a park of
light and air that is heavily used by tourists.

(161)

South Street Seaport is an oasis in the desert that is lower
Manhattan.

Sadly,

the historic buildings that now provide

so many with open space in an area with a serious dirth of

any kind of open,

light space would not have survived and

the area would have been further packed with nothing but

77

banal,

characterless plazas such as one finds along Sixth

Avenue that only benefit the developer with increased height
for more return on his investment.

For proof of the

benefits of this successful transfer program, one must visit
the Seaport on a warm spring day.
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B.

What is the role of transfer of development

rights in zoning and planning?

A concern of important dimensions is the role of

transfer of development rights in regards to municipalities
rights to set zoning limitations.

Zoning is the one, if

not the major, tool available to a municipality to carry out
its goal of providing a safe and healthy environment for its

citizenry.

Part of this healthy environment is the ability

for light and air to penetrate down to the streets.

Transfer of development rights adds density to areas that
have already been zoned by the municipality to an acceptable
height.

To add to that height, in some instances, would

create intolerable conditions of stale air and darkness at
midday.

The transfer of development rights program is to be

viewed as part of existing zoning, not as a separate unit.
In order for this to occur,

a

municipality that is

considering a transfer program must have a workable
municipal plan.

Without a plan, the results could be an

over extension of services, poor utilization of existing

conditions or services, economic displacement for the
residents, and the possible destruction of the

municipality's tax base.

The municipality must do its

planning homework.
The implementation of a transfer of development rights

program requires long term planning for the municipality.
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The municipality must be able to target areas for growth or

recognize growth in particular areas at its incipient
In other words,

stage.

the municipality must recognize

that a particular area is under -zoned for the development

pressures placed upon it.

It is legally unwise for a

municipality to down zone a potential growth area because,
if there is a municipal bank,

the municipality is open to

charges of forcing developers to buy air rights that were

once available without charge.
One area that seems to have been able to combine a

transfer of development rights program with incipient real
estate growth is Georgetown area in Washington D.C.

The

Georgetown proposal involved the preservation of the area's
riverfront.

The plan for Georgetown recognized the

construction of the Washington, D.C. Metro.

The City

Council realized that density increases would be necessary
as businesses relocated along the new service corridor.

Instead of increasing the allowable density along the Metro
Line,

-che

unused yet allowable development rights from the

riverfront were earmarked for transfer to the receiving zone
along the path of the subway.
The long term view employed in Georgetown allowed for
the implementation of a transfer of development rights

program.

When density increases were realized to be an

imminent necessity, existing zoning densities were found
verses the creation of new density allocations.

The

creation of new density would have solved one problem, but

80

.

would have done nothing to protect the historic waterfront
and the overall amount of density in Georgetown would have

increased, destroying an aspect of its character.

various elements of

a

The

municipal plan must work in concert.

With the implementation of the transfer of development
rights program and the utilization of these rights,

Washington, D.C. has satisfied its need for density while
also fulfilling its goals for preservation.

Transfer of development rights must fit into the
existing plan or the plan must be altered to coordinate the
actions of its elements.

The increased density can be

incorporated into the cityscape if the plan provides for
these increases.

Cities regularly grant variances for

building height and bulk, often without clear integration
with the existing municipal plan.
rights,

by their very nature,

Transfer of development

need to be planned.

Since

they move development rights, transferred rights are a more

controlled form of zoning enhancement.

There are many

levels of control that the transfer of development rights

must pass before their eventual implementation.

Also,

transfer of development rights, if the system allows, moves
again controlling growth in

bulk to predetermined sites,

designated area.

a

The transfer of development rights does

not undercut existing zoning.

They are a method of

controlled updating and amending of the existing municipal
code
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C.

The municipal development rights bank

Throughout the analysis, one can see the role the
development rights bank plays: the South Street Seaport and
Fred

F.

French are two such examples.

The municipal bank,

either through its absence or presence, must be a

significant feature of

a

transfer of development rights

First, we must address the question of the bank's

program.

structure: is the bank municipal or part of the private

Costonis identifies three sources for air rights to

sector?

supply the bank.

The rights are obtained from both the

public and private sectors and in some instances, utilize
the municipalities legislative abilities.

follow Costonis

's

If we are to

method of air rights retention,

(162) the

third means, acquiring air rights from municipally owned

properties, creates a conflict of interest.

A municipality

creates zoning. If the development rights transfer statute
is in the municipal plan,

result.

a direct conflict of intent is the

To be succinct, the body that creates the the

unused air rights, takes them back to fund the municipal
bank.

In theory,

if the bank came up short,

the city could

rezone its municipal properties to unobtainable, unrealistic

heights to create a large cushion for the bank.

The

program as it exists with the South Street Seaport District
seems best suited to avoid changes of conflict of

interest.

The reader may remember that in the South Street

Seaport District, the development rights bank was made up of
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a

consortium of banks that formerly held mortgages on the

historic properties.

By removing the City from the role of

municipal development rights banker, the potential for
conflict and municipal corruption is greatly reduced.
The absence of a development rights bank destroyed the
City's ability to preserve the Tudor City parks in the Fred
F.

French case.

To reiterate, it was the lack of tangible

value for the development rights that caused the failure of
the transfer.

In order for the landmark owner to receive

adequate compensation, they must be able to sell their
rights at market or near market value.

This market price

is not necessarily set by the free market.

This implies

that the market will at some time purchase the rights.

The

role of the development rights bank is to set a fair market

price for these rights, but the bank must also serve as a

repository for as-of-yet unsold rights.
The first feature of the development rights bank is its
role as a price setter for the rights.
as a repository.

Its second role is

As seen with the South Street Seaport

District, a consortium of private banks released their

mortgages on the historic properties.

In return,

they

served as the development rights bank and as the rights were
sold,

a portion of their cost was used to settle the

forgiven debt.

The rights were sold to various designated

The rights were sold as

sites in the receiving zone.

Until the time of the

needed in the market place.

purchase, the rights remained in a file drawer.
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Commercial banks by their very nature base their loans
and investments on longterm ventures.

They can afford to

wait for their return over a longer period of time than

municipality.

a

The banks' risks are well-planned and

predetermined to the best of their abilities.
of return on investment,

such as from loans,

Their rate
is somewhat

secure and constant, depending on the bank.
banks' assets are quite substantial.

Also,

the

A municipality,

however, is usually not as structured as a bank and does not

plan financially far advance.

This is due to the public

and political needs that are absent from a private bank.

The fact there are political and public pressures that exist
in government is all the more reason for the development

rights bank to remain out of public ownership.

The

development rights bank requires firm, political commitment.
It is not to be used as a tool for bargaining.

Such an

existence would make it a considerable option for developers
in search of increased density or bulk.

would not be subject to political graft.

Also, the bank

This would be

source of public lack of confidence in the bank and the
city's preservation plan as well.

Finally,

the money

realized from the sale of development rights should be used
for the landmarks plan.

on landmarks,

This may include, paying off debts

funds for restoration, buying or condemning

rights for the bank, paying for preservation easements.

There are further elements of the preservation/development
rights program that
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would need funding as well.
a

The bank is not to be seen as

source for the municipality as a whole.

for the firemen or mass transit.

It is not to pay

By creating a privately

run development right bank, we sever some aspects of the

preservation program from the city, freeing up precious
municipal resources for other city services.
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D.

Is the Transfer of Development Rights Compatible

with the Aims of Preservation?

What most certainly deserves the closest scrutiny is
the use of transferred development rights as a means of

preservation.

On the surface,

it seems that transferred

development rights are successful: twelve landmark
structures have been saved by this planning method.

But is

the result of the transfer of development rights beneficial
for preservation?

The transfer of development rights means that when the

transfer is to an adjacent site,

a

building of small scale

is sometimes overwhelmed by a neighbour not of zoned size,

but larger.

In mid-town Manhattan,

one can find landmark

structures of heights under eight stories tall side-by-side

with skyscrapers of heights 30-40 stories tall.

Part of

the preservation of a landmark is the preservation of its

scale.

While landmarking does not extend to its

non-designated neighbours, when a neighbourhood's scale can
be controlled in an area of high landmark concentration,

the

idea of increasing bulk at an adjacent site destroys not

only the scale of the landmark, but the area scale as well.
Scale is best preserved.

When a municipality utilizes a

receiving zone system such as the Theater District, density
is moved away from the Core Preservation zone.

(163)

The

key is to target areas within the zone that are sensative to
the disruption of scale.

(164)
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Again,

a

municipality's

If the increase in bulk

general plan must be thorough.

which is the result of

a

transfer are not to cause

planning disaster, the municipality must
determine

be able to

how much increase it will allow.

New York has

chosen 20 percent overage on the receiving site in

non-commercial district.

a

a

This figure is in conjunction

with their ultimate height and bulk limitations.

In

Georgetown, the municipal government could determine its

desired pattern of development and height and bulk
limitations.

If it was desired,

it could raise the

existing zoning to get to its base height; the transfer
rights would raise the building heights to their acceptable
limits.

(165)

The preservation of the cityscape is a broader issue.

Increases in bulk and height are not trivial, nor are they
minor.

(166)

Each increase in height deprives the city's

A long term view of the

residents of light and air.
increases must be considered.

While one or two increases

are probably harmless in the broad view,

the problem is when

the plan is in place for a long period of time and many

transfers have occurred.

The net result is a cluster of

tall buildings placing the smaller landmarks in shadow.

South Street Seaport District, for all of its high
qualities, does suffer from this problem.

The problem of

dark and long shadows can remain at its present level if the

surrounding area remains at either its present height or the

height as zoned is not changed.
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The cumulative affect of

the increased buildings to the south and the already built
to zoned height buildings to the west make the district

darker as the day progresses.

In the eyes of most critics,

the benefits of preserving the district hopefully outweigh
the losses.

The structures are preserved, but they do

suffer to some extent from their preservation.

An issue embodied in the above paragraph and necessary
to consider is the longterm affect of the transfer of

development rights.

In the short term,

transferred

development right provide a necessary infusion of cash for
the landmark.

Repairs on the landmark can progress. The

landmark can be rehabilitated and modernized in order for it
to reach its highest level of efficiency.
term,

In the long

transfer of development rights is questionable.

Transfer of development rights is a means of obtaining
economic stability for an urban landmark.

But what is

unfeasible about the transfer of development rights is that
their return is unstable and an unsure form of compensation

and therein lies part of their danger when counted upon to

offset financial burden.

As a form of payment or

compensation, transferred rights are granted at the time of
sale.

It is the responsibility of the seller of the rights

to find a means of steady income from the sale.

Part of

the proceeds could be returned to the building to prolong
its economic life,

but the return of investment on a

landmark will never be the same as the return on the

redeveloped site.

The assumption must be made that those
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who own landmark properties are not in the high scale, fast
paced real estate market with the likes of Donald Trump.
If the building is properly maintained,

enjoys a level of

occupancy that is sufficient for the owner to meet his

operating costs and realize
its loss of air rights,

return of

7

a

profit,

and lower taxes due to

the owner can expect to enjoy a

to 8 percent return on equity.

Added to

(167)

the return in interest from the profits of the sale, placed
in a bank at a rate of 8 percent,

the return on equity for

the owner of the site is approximately 15 percent.

higher than the return on many new buildings.

This is

What makes

the transfer of the rights questionable is that not all of

the income is derived from the site: interest rates rise and
fall.

The owner of the landmark building must double his

source of profit, thus doubling his risk.

The sale of the

air rights may not return enough to allow for sufficient

return of equity to cover the operating expenses of the
building.

Insurance rates for older buildings are higher

than those for new buildings.

(168)

Adaptive use of the older building may allow for
greater return.

a

When the older building is part of a new

structure that is adjacent to the site, it can be assumed
that some profits from the new structure will help offset
the higher operating costs of the older structure.

However, when the rights are transferred to a site that is
in a receiving zone and not part of the original site,

the

chances for some sort of economic link between the new and
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the old are unlikely.

At South Street Seaport, the entire

preservation zone can be seen as

a

singular entity and the

receiving zone as another, adjacent entity.

In affect,

system in place at the Seaport is similar to rather large
adjacent lots.

Owners in the District would not relay

information about their returns, citing confidentiality.
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E.

Is the Transfer of Development Rights

Compensation

The concept of compensation is central to the issue of

transfer of development rights.

Before the 1978 Supreme

Court decision in Penn Central, transfer of development
rights,

it appears, were not considered as a means of

compensation on

a

national level.

The threat of

legislative taking had been challenged in the courts, but
solutions involving transferring rights or even less

sophisticated means of land control were usually not
discussed.

The Supreme Court determined that transferable

development rights were a valuable asset, mitigated any
financial loss for the Terminal, and countered the extent of
the legislative action.

(165)

Before the courts can begin to determine if the

transfer of development rights serves as compensation, it
must determine if a taking has occurred.

In Penn Central

,

we see that the Court determined that a taking had not
occurred, therefore the air rights could be used to help

determine the severity of the government's action.

The

Court stated plainly that the rights may not have fulfilled
their definition of compensation if a taking had occurred.

While stating that the rights had a value,

for Fifth

Amendment purposes, that value may not have been enough.
The theoretical value of the rights is unchallenged.

their actual market value that is disputable.
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It is

Similar to

land,

the value of development rights fluctuates with the

But the difference is in the fact that the

market.

development rights are not tangible and subject to more than
just the economic whims of the market.
down,

If the market is

their value is not to be realized at all.

What one

purchases with development rights is potential.
In Fred F. French

,

the question of the transfer of

development rights is answered.

The question is: Does the

transfer of development rights serve as a means of

compensation that satisfy the conditions of the Fifth

Amendment?

In Fred F.

French

,

the Court of Appeals found

the fact that the TDRs were not linked to specific receiving

parcels rendered them so abstract and uncertain that they

could not be treated as just compensation.

The development

rights of the parks were valuable, but not adequate to

compensate for the complete loss of the property's
prof itablity.
the action.
rights,

Their lack of adequacy was due in part to
But also, the unpredictable value of the

as mentioned above,

fails to allow the rights to

serve as a source of compensation.

A transfer of development rights program with some sort
of development rights bank would validate any compensation

option.

The seller of the rights would be guaranteed some

sort of tangible return.

He would have the option of an

immediate sale on the market at a negotiated price or sale
to the bank at a predetermined, yet competitive, price.

The bank price would reflect the surety of the deal while
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the market price would reflect the risks of the market

place
A central feature of the New York program is the

establishment of a trust fund for the maintenance of the
landmark.

rights.

This is figured into the cost of the development
The trust fund,

as seen with the Theater report,

can be created to do more than just fund maintenance.
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New York City and the Transfer of Development Rights
A.

Recommendations for change

New York has a transfer program that is active, working
at South Street Seaport, Amster Yard,

the old First Precinct

Police Station and most recently the Theater District.

Each of these examples has merits, but it must be remembered
that when the program fails,

chances are that the landmark

will be demolished or severely altered.

The New York

Program, while retaining important features,

needs to change

to make the transfer of development rights the best possible

means of saving landmarks while allowing for growth.

The

following recommendations are made to improve the program
and preserve the City's landmarks.

The city must first

make development rights transfers more competitive with

zoned lot mergers.

Second,

adjacency requirements.

it must become flexible in

Third,

it must write legislation

which would enable it to create a development rights bank.

Transferring development rights is less popular than
zoning bonuses or the zoned lot merger.

If the City is

committed to preservation, it must make transfer of
development rights more competitive.

In a tight area such

as Wall Street or central midtown,

transfer of development

rights will probably be effective.

Zoning bonuses do not

work well on lots less than a quarter of a block in size.
Transfer of development rights could be the answer if the
allow for increases in lot coverage.

94

Transferred

development rights are more profitable to

developer than a

a

zoning bonus as long as the development rights can be
utilized to regularize the shape of the building for greater
efficiency.

(167)

The transfer of development rights has

been used for additional lot coverage at South Street
Seaport.

The higher a building is, the more floor space

that must be turned over for mechanical use.

The

(170)

increase in the coverage allows for more rentable space in
buildings built upon narrow lots that would normally require
them to step back and thus diminish floor size.

Handled

with care and in concert with a well developed plan, the
bulk increases will not impact as severely on the cityscape.
The idea of adjacency as embodied in the New York

program appears to be an invitation to planning excesses.
Buildings of small scale can be overwhelmed by adjacent tall
skyscrapers.

To transfer the rights away from the site can

permit the building to be viewed in an uncluttered

environment.

The scale of not only the building but of the

immediate vicinity can be saved as well.

While this is not

an aspect of a landmark that can be controlled,

the City can

do its role by limiting the amount of air rights that can be

transferred to an adjacent site regardless of the use of the
building.

By allowing for transfer to occur only at

adjacent sites, the City has made the rights more difficult
to sell by limiting the options afforded to the landmark
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owner.

By allowing for the transfer of the rights through

a district,

the owner has that many more purchasers for his

right accessible to him.

A municipality can employ both options:
zone and an adjacent site.

a

receiving

Development rights transfers to

adjacent sites should be limited to a certain percentage of
the rights allowable for the adjacent site.

Currently, the

New York City program allows for the receiving site to
increase overage by 20 percent in non-commercial low density
areas.

This should be an across-the-board limitation for

all adjacent sites.

An adjacent site commercial or

non-commercial, high or low density can be designated to

receive either part or all of the 20 percent allotment of
the unused rights that is allowed to be transferred to

adjacent sites.

If any remainds of the 20 percent,

be transferred to other adjacent sites.

it can

The remaining 80

percent of the rights can either stay with the building and
remain unused, be sold to a site away from the landmark lot,
or be sold to the development rights bank.

abuse,

To prevent

the 80 percent transfer to non-adjacent lots should

be flexible.

All or part of the 80 percent can be

transferred to a high density commercial district and in a
low density, non-commercial district the greatest overage

increase would be 20 percent per lot.
The development rights bank is the third feature

necessary for the full use of development rights transfers
in New York.

The South Street Seaport district used a
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private development rights bank and the program has been
successful in saving landmarks in the District.

The bank

would buy and sell rights, regulate prices, and importantly,
preserve landmarks through condemnation of landmark rights.

Condemnation could be made through the city acting either on
behalf of the bank or independent of it.

The development

rights bank as observed earlier would be best served in

private hands.

However, the potential for conflict lies in

the fact that municipal rights and duties will be handed
over to a private body.

A system such as one finds at

South Street is fine, but for the City to create a bank each
time it is needed when lend an air of temporariness and

instability to the bank.

The features that made the bank

so attractive and plausible in the private sector must be

utilized in the public sector bank.

The risks of municipal

impropriety and corruption are present and it will be up to
the development community to watchdog this political unit

that is in place to work with them.
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XI

.

Conclusion

The transfer of development rights is a tool that

enables urban landmarks to become economically competitive.
However,

the concept of the transfer of development rights

has many challenges and hurdles that it must surmount in
order for any program of this kind to be successful.

The

municipality that wishes to employ such a system must insure
that it is prepared

perspective.

both from a legal and planning

Without this preparatory work, the

municipality's transfer program and the landmarks it intends
to preserve are endangered.
The preservation movement in the United States has gone

from private,

special interest oriented groups to public

policy and, with the transfer of development rights, back to
the private realm.

The transfer of development rights is a

way to shift the responsibility of landmark retention from
the municipal to the private.

Landmarks are saved by

private investment.
Our legal system is based upon a heritage which spans

over half a millenium.

Property is one of the more

important aspects of our legal system.

Laws have been

written to protect our lives, freedom, and our property;
this means our land rights as well as our material goods.

The protection of this right is embodied in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
However,

limitations of the use of property in defence of
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the common good or what has been called the general welfare,

The City of

began with the first zoning ordinance in 1916.

New York passed this ordinance that restricted the height
The right of a municipality

and bulk of new construction.

to legislate land use controls was upheld in the United

States Supreme Court's decision in Village of E uclid v

Ambler Realty Co.

.

»

The preservation of our built environment began in

Legislation such as the

earnest in the late 1960s.

National Historic Preservation Act was able to become a
reality due to Supreme Court decisions such as United States
V.

Gettysburg Electric Railway Co. and Berman v

.

Parker

.

While not directly dealing with historic preservation, these
decisions have been applied to preservation cases to foster
a

preservation ethic.

In 1978,

the Supreme Court's Penn

Central decision formulated a procedure to determine the

extent of legislative taking.

This decision, while

specifically dealing with the use of land and the right of a

municipality to legislate land use controls, has greatly
advanced the legal cause of historic preservation.
A central feature to the legislation of land use is the
"taking": the taking of property is the overextension of a

legislation.

When the courts have determined that

regulation is so extensive as to destroy a property owner's
use of his property,

a

taking has occurred.

The taking of

property requires compensation to the owner.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is the classic
definition of a legislative taking.
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It determined the

extent to which the Kohler Act destroyed the Company's

ability to mine coal profitably.

Also determined was the

extent to which the general public was affected by the

subsidence of the surface.
The Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City

decision in 1978 re-evaluated the Pennsylvania Coal
doctrine.

In a four step procedure, Justice Brennan

refuted the claims of legislative taking asserted by the
railroad.

His procedure influenced judicial determination

in similar circumstances.

The four steps are determination

of the legitimacy of the property claim, Fifth Amendment

application, evaluation of the legislation, and lastly,

determine the extent of the legislative action upon the

property and diminution in value and balance the the
objectives of the legislation and the result to determine if
a

taking had occurred.
In the past year,

two cases have come before the

Supreme Court that have dealt with the issue of taking:
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association y. DeBenedictus and

Nollan

V.

California Coastal Commission

.

These cases have

utilized the procedure of weighing affect of legislation on
the property owner verses the needs of the general public

and how well the legislation in question fulfills that
need.

In Keystone Bituminous Coal

,

the court reaffirmed

its stance of viewing different layers of property as an

ensemble and not as individual parts of an owner's site.
In Nollan, the court continued the practice of determining
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the extent of a legislative action on the property owner and
its ability to serve the public.

Once the court determines that a taking has occurred,

compensation must be paid to the owner.
fair market value for the property.

This is to be the

In P enn Central

,

the

Supreme Court determined that a taking had not occurred and
the presence of the Terminal's valuable air rights mitigated
any financial burden placed upon the railroad by landmark

The Supreme court stated clearly that had

designation.

they determined that a taking had occurred, the air rights
This was a

alone may not have been adequate compensation.

theoretical determination.

Appeals case, Fred
York

,

F.

In the New York State Court of

French Investment Co.

v.

City of New

the Court determined that a taking had occurred.

The

air rights that the City allowed to be transferred to the

midtowm business district were valuable, but they did not
equally compensate the owner for the extent to which his
land was taken.
a

The Court also stated that had there been

guarantee of their sale, a similar conclusion may not have

been reached.

The transfer of development rights program

as it exists in New York City does not a permanent transfer

of development rights bank and will surely see a repeat of

the F red F

.

French case in similar circumstances.

The P enn

Central decision should be regarded as further warning that,
legally, the use of the transfer of development rights as a

source of compensation is a risky project.

The Chicago Plan was developed by John J. Costonis.
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It is his attempt to synthesize a complete transfer of

development rights program for the city of Chicago.
plan could be utilized in any urban center.

The

The Plan

attempts to make urban landmarks economically competitive

Costonis attempts

with the zoned potential for the site.

to reconcile the Plan and its transfer of development rights

mechanism with existing zoning and land use practices.
Practices such as zoning bonuses and lot mergers are

discussed in relation to transfers.

The use of the

transfer of development rights is seen as

zoning augmentation:

a

sounder means of

the net increase in urban density is

zero as bulk and density are not added to the existing
regulation, but moved from one site to another within the

existing zoning fabric.
The Chicago Plan consists of four elements: the

incentive package, the preservation restriction, the

development rights transfer district, and the municipal
development rights bank.

The incentive package determines

the economic needs and value of the site as a result of

designation.

The preservation restriction provides for the

continued existence of the site from which the air rights
came.

The development rights transfer district is the area

designated by the municipality to receive the transferred
rights.

The municipal development rights bank is the

municipal agency that stores, sells, and determines the
price for development rights.
concert,

These four elements work in

creating a system which in theory successfully
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They keep the system from

transfers development rights.

being abused or from density increases being haphazardly
granted.

The transfer of development rights program in New York

City contains some of these elements in varying degrees

according to the situation.

The sites reviewed were Amster

Yard, South Street Seaport District and Tudor City.

Amster

Yard was one of the first transfer to take place in the
City.

The rights were transferred to an adjacent site.

There was not a development rights transfer district for

Amster Yard.

The buildings of Amster Yard were saved, but

in conclusion,

it appears that it terms of scale and

preservation of light and air, Amster Yard fails.
buildings are overwhelmed by its larger neighbour.

The

South

Street Seaport District is the closest to the Chicago Plan
with a transfer district, preservation restriction and a

development rights bank.

South Street also is the most

successful of the three.

The buildings are preserved as is

the general scale of the neighbourhood.

tends to be dark towards mid-day,

the general character of

The area's benefits are shared by

the area is preserved.

not only those who work in the area,

throughout the world.

Though the area

but tourists from

The development rights bank is

private, allowing the City to be freed from the worries of

long-term outlay of cash.

The banks that held mortgages on

the historic buildings were repayed from proceeds of the

rights sales.

Tudor City shows how the City attempted to
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preserve open space by offering
transfer to an owner.
its case in Court.

a

development rights

The owner refused and the City lost
The City's development rights transfer

program as it exists on paper does not work.

It

is only

when the program is tailored to a particular situation,

using the existing code as

a

firm foundation,

Street Seaport that one finds

a

as at South

truly successful program.

Economically, the transfer of development rights is an

additional cost to an owner.

The transfer of development

rights cost an additional $84 per square foot in one
example.

But in comparison to zoned lot mergers and zoning

bonuses, the transfer of rights is competitive.

With the

zoned lot merger, one has the acquisition of the additional

landmark site to consider, plus full restoration and

renovation costs of the landmark if it is to be part of the
new project.

If

there are buildings to be demolished, this

is an additional cost.

Also,

the cost of this demolition

is not deductible from the cost of the project.

With the

zoning bonus, rental space is lost at the expense of

providing open public space.

This ultimately raises the

cost per square foot as well.

Three types of transfer systems exist: the adjacent,
the receiving, and the free.

The adjacent system is when

the rights are transferred to a site adjacent to the

landmark site.

This system can result in buildings which

overwhelm their smaller, landmark neighbours.
currently allows for the full transfer of
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a

The program

building's

.

development rights in

a

high density commercial district.

At a site such as Grand Central,

the Terminal could be

dominated by a neighbour that uses all of its development
rights.

The receiving zone system is either where the

receiving zone overlaps the area of landmark concentration
or is removed from the core area.

The overlap system has

the potential for abuse similar to the adjacency system,

unless some prohibition about adjacent transfers is
specified.

The removed receiving zone with predetermined

sites within the zone seems to work best, satisfying the
needs of develop to increase zoning while keeping those

increases away from the area wished to be preserved.
Amenities such as low-scale, light, air, and sufficient use
of services are the result.

The free zone is a receiving

zone with no specific site -designated for the reception of

transferred rights.

This system seems the least

successful, as it was one of the factors in the Fred F

French decision.

If

there exists a development rights

bank, the free zone would be a more successful system

legally, but from

a

planning perspective, the municipality

would be neglecting its responsibility to provide a decent

environment for its inhabitants.

The result of increasing

bulk is not acceptable everywhere.
Many issues arise from a transfer of development rights

program.

The first issue is whether or not the benefits of

the transfer such as retention of light and air and scale
are

enjoyed by all.

If

the receiving zone for the
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transferred rights is too far from the source of the rights,
a

court could determine that the benefits are for only a
To prevent such a charge,

few.

a

municipality must insure

that the program protects the rights and welfare of all its

citizens
The second issue is: does transfer of development

rights work with planning and zoning?

The transfer of

development rights must work with existing zoning and
plans.

The role of a transfer program is to protect

landmarks while enhancing the effectiveness of the code.
Neither the existing code or the transfer program are to
work against each other.
The third issue is whether or not a development rights

bank is necessary.

The result of Fred F. French

illustrates that the presence of such a bank will enhance
the preservation objectives of a municipality.

existence of

a

The

development rights bank at South Street

allowed for both the banks and the preservationists to be
happy, allowing each group to get what it wanted from the

program.

The developer in the receiving zone were also

able to obtain valuable rights from the bank which allowed

them to build more efficient and thus more profitable

buildings on their sites.
Transfer of development rights and its compatibility
with preservation is the fourth issue.

While the transfer

of development rights does allow for the economic survival
of

urban landmarks, it does have a detrimental affect
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Areas affected are the relationship

on smaller landmarks.

of the landmark to its neighbours,

the preservation of the

cityscape, and the preservation of the buildings use.

The final issue is whether or not the transfer of

development rights provides adequate compensation for an

Reviewing both Fred

owner if a taking has occurred.

French and Penn Central

,

F.

one can see that the transfer of

development rights is a risky prospect as compensation.
a development rights bank is created,

If

the rights may be

adequate, but this has yet to determined.

Under the

decision of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles

,

the Court held that if

there is a taking, compensation must be paid.

Some sort of

additional monies will be needed to pay for the long term
affects of the taking.
bank,

If there is a development rights

additional rights may be added to a site for sale, but

either from this source or from cash sources, the

municipality would suffer financially.
Three things are recommended for the New York City
transfer of development rights program in order for it to

work more effectively.

The City must make the transfer of

development rights more competitive with the zoned lot
merger.

The transfer of develpment rights should be

designated to be used for increases in lot coverage.

The

City also must more flexible in its ad;]acency requirements.
The City must determine what is adjacent and what is not and
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move towards either an area wide or block wide transfer
scheme.

Also requirements how much air rights may be

transferred to an adjacent site must be reconsidered.
Thirdly,

the City must considered creating a development

rights bank that would effectively preserve its landmarks.

At this time, the transfer of development rights

program in New York is at a crucial point.
success and failures in its past.
to plan for the future.

The program has

It is time for the City

The transfer of development rights

can work to bring about a change in the way our old

buildings are seen.

The landmark building can finally make

an attempt to stand on its own,

not only within the realm of

architectural significance and planning, but in the market
place as well.
In conclusion,

there are certain evaluations that can

be derived from this analysis.

The transfer of development

rights will not always further the goals of preservation,

it

is not a long-term solution to the greater problem of

preservation of

a

structure and its use, preservation of

individual sites to create light and air parks is
detrimental to broader preservation goals, and as a means of

solving legal problems, the transfer of development rights
is a risky utilization.j

One must realize when they enter the field of

preservation that there will always be those who are opposed
to the ideals and goals of preservation.

The reasons are

sometimes economic, but they are usually of a broader issue
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regarding the use of one's home and the sanctity of that
These are concepts from the constitution.

home.

Economic

assistance such as the ability to transfer one's air rights
are attractive to these individuals.

One such example is

the theater owners in New York's mid-town.

Over twenty

theaters were designated landmarks last year.

With that

designation came the right to transfer the theaters' unused
rights to sites within a special mid-town zoning district.

Owners of the theaters such as the Shubert and Nederlander

organizations have fought the designations from the start,
citing both constitutional and economic reasons.
owners have recently filed suit in

a

The

New York court to

overturn their designations, stating that the designations
are an economic burden.

They can no longer alter the

interiors to suit the needs of a given production because
the bureaucratic process increases the turnover time for a
theater,

the necessary replacement cost for features removed

to accommadate a production are too expensive,

and the

development rights do not provide adequate relief for the
theaters because it does not meet the costs of running a
theater profitably.
As can be seen, the owners are not going to utilize
their right of transferability.

They are simply opposed to

the idea of designation and the transfer of their rights

does not alter their way of thinking.

Since the

designation of the theaters, at least three projects in
various stages of development have utilized rights from the
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theaters.

Certainly the designations and zoning insentives

from the city have unleashed a flury of building activity

along Broadway.

However, regardless of this boom and the

apparent willingness of developers to utilize those rights
for taller and bulkier buildings, the theater owners want

their designations revoked.

Try as we may in the

preservation field, we must realize that the transfer of
development rights will not appeal to everyone and they are
not a panacea for all of our preservation woes.

Individual transfers such as those that do and will

occur in the special theater district do not provide

a

long

term solution for preservation of our historic structures.

This is especially true when there is some restrictive use
as to the future employment of the site.

This only serves

to exerscerbate the problem of saving the landmark and can
be viewed as a significant factor in the eventual decline of

the structure.
The problem that exists in the theater district is one
of unprof itability

.

The City has determined that various

theaters are worth saving in the mid-town west area.

theaters have valuable air rights.

These

The air rights are to

be sold and the theater and its owner will receive a quick

injection of cash.
theater is saved.
a

On the surface it may appear that the

However, what is to happen the next time

theater is in financial trouble?

I

do not see how the

transfer of development rights component used in the theater

district will provide for the long term survival of those
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buildings.

The presence of a trust fund is encouraging, but if

the financial troubles of the theater industry continue at their

present level, it is difficult to understand how the fund will be
The singular use of the

able to rescue all of the theaters.

transfer of development rights is no longer an option.
The use of air rights transfers in the theater district is a

political tool utilized by the current mayoral administration to

placate a segment of its constituency.

When the financial

problems of the theaters becomes insurmountable as they surely
The Koch

will, the Koch administrationwill be long gone.

administration has not analyzed the uderlying causes for the

degeneration of the theater in New York.
use, character,

While the changes in

and demographics of mid-town west are surely

a

factor, one must also acknowledge that it now costs between $40

and $50 to see a show on Broadway.

enemy of the theater.

The developer is the sole

The actors who so vocally fought for

designation after the destruction of the Helen Hayes and Morosco
theaters failed to recognize the causes for the destruction that
exist within their community.

Union wages, unnecessary

production staff, high salaries for feature performers have all
contributed to the demise of the theater.

Very few

theater-goers seem to be surprised when told of
in excess of one million dollars.

a

production cost

The prohibitive rates

demanded by Actors Equity have condemned the Lyceum Theater to
continued darkness as the Vivian Beaumont Theater-in-Exile

program seems unlikely to be realized. (171)
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The preservation community sadly followed the administration
in its praises of an evaluation that did not explore all the

pertainant facts.

The Theater Advisory Council's report on the

theaters does not question itself, the theater community.

It

is

time for the theater community to examine itself and not

potentially destroy

a

preservation/planning tool that has had

such successes as the South Street Seaport.
The idea that the transfer of development rights creates

light and air parks over individual landmarks in congested urban

centers is false.

In

actuality, the ability of the landmark to

successful be part of the streetscape is destroyed.

This is not

to mean that we are to sacrifice our low-scale landmarks.

However, in the future it may be beneficial to create zones of
hard and soft preservation.

By intigrating a system of

development rights transfers in to the idea of hard and soft
zones of preservation, development next to not only landmarks but

whole historic districts can be controlled to protect broader,
more liveable areas of light and air.
the present.

This does not exist in

The transfer of development rights program in New

York can generally be viewed as a failure in this respect,

placing such elegant buildings as the First Precinct Police
Station in a forest of behemouths.

And such historic districts

as Brooklyn Heights find their very boaders victim of tall

building encroachment.
A new threat exists along the waterfront of the City.

The

Hudson River waterfront is experiencing development pressures as
the success of the New Jersey Gold Coast and Battery Park City
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has developers and municipalities re-evaluating the potential of

Historic districts which border the

these long forgotten areas.

waterfront such as Greenwhich Village and Soho run the risk of
being hidden behind

a

wall of buildings built at as-of right
To surround historic districts

zoning, augmented by bonuses.

with areas of softer preservation restrictions would prevent such
an occcurence.

These soft areas are to be receiving zones for

the landmark's or district's development rights.
the site in question,

The closer to

the less development rights allowed to be

received on that site.

The City would be able to control the

amount of development that would occur in these high growth rate
areas.

Instead of creating mediocre shafts of light that

isolate a landmark or hemming in

a

district by tall buildings,

broader areas of light and air can be realized.

Landmarks and

districts can be integrated into the existing streetscape and
cityscape and vice versa.

The present practice of historic

districts being encapsulated by tall neighbours creates a sense
of disruptive shock as one entires the preservation zone.

This

is then followed by a sense of appreciation for the qualities of

the district.

While this practice distinctly sets the area

apart as someplace special, it is detrimental to the city as

whole.

a

The city is to be viewed as a fabric, say a quilt.

Each square has its own distinct pattern yet it is clear that it
is part of a greater entity.

The transfer of development

rights, moving rights from hard preservation zones to soft

preservation zones, would allow the City to control the impact
development has on historic districts and their adjoining
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.

communities.

The City would ensure that there is sufficient

open space and building setbacks for not only the landmarks and

districts to retain open, airy qualities, but the City as

a

whole

as well

The ability to transfer development rights is
can be used to create an urban environment for all.

a

power that
It

can be

used to preserve our past while aiding in the construction of our
future.

Many in the preservation field are short-sighted,

seeing the immediate preservation of a landmark or a district as
the goal and the ability of that landmark or of that area to

survive in to the next five or ten years from now is either
The use of a transfer option

forgotten or never considered.

within a preservation area and in conjunction with other planning
efforts and ideas will allow an area to not only survive in

perpetuity

,

but to continue giving something back to the

community and the city at large.
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